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DEVELOPING EVIDENCE BASED MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS IN INDIA-EU MIGRATION AND PARTNERSHIP (DEMO: INDIA-EU MAP)

Norwegian residents of Indian origin National and transnational integration

Helge Hiram Jensen
Geir-Tore Brenne

DEMO-India Research Report 2015/13



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DEMO-India
Developing Evidence based Management and Operations in
India-EU Migration and Partnership

Research Report
Thematic Report
DEMO-India RR 2015/13

Norwegian residents of Indian origin
National and transnational integration

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DEMO-India – Developing Evidence based Management and Operations in India-EU Migration and Partnership (DEMO: India-EU MaP)

The Demo: India-EU MaP project, co-funded by the European Commission, is a continuation of the Carim India project (www.india-eu-migration.eu) and it examines the multiple facets of Indian migration to the EU. Its overall aim is to improve migration management between India and the EU, strengthen EU-India relations, and produce in-depth empirical knowledge about the different migration streams and pathways of Indian nationals in the EU. Its specific goals include providing:

1. Evidence based research for more informed policy making and state intervention.
2. Improved source country capacity in managing migration.
3. Raising awareness among potential migrants of the risks of irregular migration.
4. Collaboration with civil society groups.
5. Empirical research and analysis of Indian communities across the EU, and their impact.

The project is led by the Indian Centre for Migration in Delhi with the partnership of the Migration Policy Centre, RSCAS, EUI.

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Abstract

This report provides an overview of existing social science knowledge about Norwegian residents of Indian origin. This is relevant for policy makers in Europe and India, because the Norwegian case, in spite of its small size, is well documented. On this basis, the report theorizes how diasporas produce economic development. The report starts with a critical literature review, and proceeds with thematic chapters on history, demography, socio-economic integration, legal framework, and socio-cultural integration. For each topic, the report summarizes findings from all existing quantitative and qualitative research, showing the Indian diaspora to be a particularly successful non-Western minority in a Western host country. The report, therefore, gives some sense of why the Indian diaspora in Norway is interpreted as successful case of economic and cultural integration. But the report also addresses the level of international integration, in economic and cultural terms, between the areas of arrival and the areas of origin. Pushing beyond the limitations of methodological nationalism, the report conceptualizes diaspora communities as transnational social capital, which contribute to future economic development, within the historical context of geographically uneven development. The report discusses the conceptual implications regarding key issues like internal and external colonialism, intersectional discrimination, national cultural plurality, and remittances as development strategy. In sum, the report suggests an approach for future diaspora research. The phenomena of socio-economic and socio-cultural “integration” should be discussed not only within a national context, as an issue of inclusion within a host nation, but also transnationally, as an issue of ties or even fellowship between different nations.

Key words: Indian diaspora, international integration, socio-economic integration, socio-cultural integration

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1. Summary and introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the existing social scientific knowledge about Norwegian residents of Indian origin. With increasing economic integration between India and Europe, Norway accounts for only a fraction of the exchange of migration, capital and goods. But it is, nevertheless, relevant because it is a well-researched case. The Indian diaspora in Norway are often seen as a particularly successful example of diaspora from non-Western areas within Western Europe. In welfare policy terms, the group is seen as a particularly successful example of integration into the host state, and as such, the Indian diaspora has received special attention from policy makers. Immigrants from the “first wave”, which came to Norway from the 1960s up until the 1980s, are well established with employment, small business entrepreneurship, and children who pursue higher education, especially within the health professions. The “second wave” started at the very beginning of this century, and consists largely of highly-qualified technical and scientific personnel, many of whom work in the Norwegian petroleum industry.

The report has seven chapters: (1) this introductory summary; (2) a critical literature review; (3) then a historical overview; (4) a demographical overview; (5) a chapter on socio-economic integration; (6) one on the legal framework which regulates the migration; and (7) a chapter on socio-cultural integration. The critical literature review suggests some new perspectives, which we have attempted to develop in the report. Thus, the historical chapter includes a transnational history of geographically uneven development. The chapters on socio-economic integration and socio-cultural integration include, meanwhile, debates about increasing transnational integration between nations, as well as the more traditional debate about the integration of diaspora groups into host nations. Our hope is that this new perspective will be found fruitful by researchers working on the Indian diaspora in various host countries, or alternatively workers on other diaspora groups in Norway. Most of the data behind employed here are registry data from Statistics Norway, and most of the findings are from secondary sources. In addition, we have carried out a pilot study on how the Norwegian mass media portrays the Indian diaspora, which is found in Appendix 3. One paragraph in the chapter on legal regulations is an extract from an earlier Carim-India report, written by ourselves. In the present report, the two authors have developed most of the thinking presented here together, though Jensen has written chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7, and Appendix 2 and 3, while Brenne has written chapter 6 and Appendix 3.

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2. Critical literature review

For the social sciences, Norwegian residents of Indian origin constitute a small matter within any research on living conditions among non-Western origin diaspora communities. Most existing writing is to be found within Norwegian “immigration research”. For the sake of convenience, I will give separate presentations for *quantitative* and *qualitative* forms of *immigration research* regarding Indian-Norwegians. However, not only immigration research, but also some other research, which I will characterize as attempts at “*giving voice*” to *subaltern subjects* has focused on Norwegian Indians. This literature review includes all the contributions that I have been able to find by searching through *Bibsys* and *Oria*, the national university library databases, as well as the database at Statistics

Norway.¹ In the following, I will first present all the contributions within each of the three fields of research mentioned above. I will, after, sum up some main findings from the research. In the end, a critical discussion will lead to suggestions for further research.

2.1 Quantitative immigration research

In quantitative “immigration research” in Norway, the Norwegian residents of Indian origin have been the subject of special interest because they are seen as a successful “immigrant community”; successful that is with regard to the main concern for this strand of research, namely social marginalization from or integration into the middle class majority in Norway.

First, Statistics Norway has published a number of reports with descriptive statistics. These show some trends in the register data regarding the living conditions among immigrants, with comparisons across selected countries of origin, including India. The reports focus on selected topics, such as: demographic structure (Henriksen 2007; Pettersen 2009); economic conditions (Hirsch 2010; Epland and Kirkeberg 2014; Omholt and Strøm 2014); marriage patterns (Wiik 2014; Sandnes and Østby 2015); crime rates (Skarðhamar, Thorsen and Henriksen 2011); and participation in electoral politics (Wiggen and Aalandslid 2014). None of these reports takes any particular interest in Norwegian residents of Indian origin. They tend, rather, to compare living conditions across ten to twenty different countries of origin. In this context, the Norwegian residents of Indian origin are largely seen as an example of a relatively successful immigrant group, with relatively good education, more high-status employment, lower levels of crime, and a higher level of political participation. The reports from Statistics Norway tend to be rather descriptive, and they seldom address theoretical issues. There are, for example, no explanatory analyses; explanatory models; or issues of conceptual validity. Nevertheless, Statistics Norway makes its register data available for social researchers who inquire about such issues.

Second, some university-based quantitative sociologists are building upon the register data from Statistics Norway, in order to inquire into issues of causality or conceptual validity. They belong to an environment of researchers who take a special interest in education levels as an indicator of social stratification and marginalization (e.g. Schou 2006, 2013; Fekjær 2006; Lervik 2010, 2012, 2014; Birkeland *et al.* 2014). In this context, researchers often discuss the *reasons* for marginalization versus integration, when comparing various ethnic origins or various class positions among citizens. To explain such differences, the researchers debate the relative weight of individual choice versus structural strains. One might see an implicit reference to the policy debate between Neoclassical and Marxian political economy, where the researchers serve social liberal or liberal socialist policies. They also discuss the relative weight of economic determinants versus cultural determinants, where one might see an implicit reference to other policy debates. Researchers refrain from “vulgar culturalism”, or what Edward Said (1978) called “orientalism”, which would assume that liberty and equality are specifically Western values, and that non-Western culture is against such values. However, they have also moved away from the one-sided application of economic models (be they Neoclassical or Marxist ones). Thus, more recent contributors to this literature emphasize the relevance of diaspora communities and transnational networks in explaining the successful integration into the Norwegian middle class of Norwegian residents of Indian or Pakistani origin (Lervik 2014a).

Finally, it should be noted that all this research based on official register data is an ongoing fifteen-year long process. Until the turn of the millennium, sociologists in Norway gave relatively little attention to “ethnicity”, though “class” and “gender” had been much studied in the post-war period. This might be because the registration of ethnicity had historically been a tool for the racist

¹ This sampling technique is not infallible. Aarset (2015) had not yet been included in the search database at the moment of searching. Ananthakrishnan (1987) was registered, but hard to access. The examples indicate that errors might occur when library searching systems are used to indicate the extension of a discourse.

administration of national minorities and indigenous peoples (Søby 2014). However, this data has also been used by the ethnically marginalized as a tool for emancipation (*ibidem*). In the late 1960s, when Norway began to receive labor migrants from India and other non-western countries, the official state registers had no procedures to observe the living conditions of these new residents. Thus, it was a religious association for Lutheran *diakonia* (Diakonhjemmet University High School) which carried out the pioneering socio-economic studies of living conditions among the first labor migrants from non-western countries, such as India (Bø 1979a, 1979b, 1980). Some social historians have tried to fill in the missing pieces regarding the 1980s and 1990s, by combining an eclectic mix of various register data from Statistics Norway (Wist 2000). When we observe the social conditions of scientific practice, the quantitative immigration research in Norway can be identified (to use Foucault's expression) as a "discursive formation" and a particular institutional practice. The reports from Statistics Norway constitute its core, and as they avoid addressing contested theories, they may implicitly apply hegemonic theories. The early attempts by non-state actors to gather socio-economic data on immigrants, as well as the historian's attempt to gather historical statistics from various sources, may be seen as entrepreneurial attempts to empower the emancipatory potential of quantitative immigration research.

2.2 Qualitative immigration research

Within qualitative "immigration research" in Norway, the Norwegian residents of Indian origin have received less attention than the overlapping categories of the Punjabi and Sikh diaspora. These researchers inquire into specificity rather than regularity, and, thus, they are less interested in comparisons across various countries of origin, and more interested in particular diaspora communities. Such diaspora communities may be organized according to country of origin (such as India),. They may, though, equally be organized by region of origin (such as Punjab) or by confession (e.g. Sikh, Hindu or Christian).

First, some social anthropologists took interest in the first wave of labor migration to Norway from India, Pakistan and other non-Western countries. The newly arrived migrants received visits from Norwegians who had carried out participant observation in the relevant countries of origin. The first Norwegian residents of Indian origin were few in number, mostly settled in one particular town in Norway, Drammen, and all originated from one particular region in India, Punjab. Thus, it was possible to employ participant observation as a method to study the life of this diaspora within the local environments at both ends of their migration route (Kramer 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1980d; Tambs-Lyche 1979a, 1979b). Since Punjab had been divided between India and Pakistan in 1949, research on labor migration from Indian Punjab was compared with similar migration from Pakistani's Punjab (Aase 1979a, 1979b, 1991). Among the interesting observations one can mention that Drammen 1979 found that the memories of sectarian conflict in Punjab 1949 were recent and painful. They prevented much social integration between immigrants from Pakistani Punjab, who were mostly Moslem, and the Indian Punjab, who were mostly Hindus or Sikhs (Kramer 1979a: 147-148). It might also be mentioned that among the first Norwegian residents of Indian origin, the ethnographer met many individuals who had found occupations in Norway below what, in class and education terms, they might have expected in India (see e.g. Kramer 1979a: 150). For more about the latter issue, see Appendix 1.

Secondly, there has been one pilot study carried out about the second wave of labor migration from India to Norway, in the last fifteen years, many migrants from which settled in Stavanger, a town with a large oil industry (Staurland 2012). The interview data in the thesis may be used to suggest hypotheses for further research: though the concluding chapter seems rather "national romantic" by assuming the existence of coherent national cultures in Norway and India.

Thirdly, some religious studies researchers have inquired into diaspora communities that are maintained through religious associations. For the present report, I have done an unsystematic

literature search for published research regarding the relevant religious diaspora communities in Norway. This literature search does not indicate much about the extension of this field of research, but it shows that it contains substantial contributions. Most of the Hindu and Sikh Norwegian residents do have Indian origins, but some are from other countries. In addition, there are some Norwegian residents of Indian origin belong to other religions, including Christianity (e.g. Bettum 2007; Jacobsen 2008, 2011).

Fourth, some research within media studies deals with the symbolic representation of “India” within the Norwegian mass media: though this is not the same as symbolic representation of Norwegian residents of Indian origin (Eide 2002, 2005).

Fifth, some historians and sociologists have combined quantitative and qualitative data in order to reconstruct a particular historical process or a regular causal mechanism. In my review of quantitative studies above, I mentioned one historian and one sociologist who have compared the life courses of Norwegian residents of Indian and Pakistani origin. Both used quantitative register data in order to “zoom out” on some general patterns, and both employed qualitative life story interviews in order to “zoom in” on some particular causal links or mechanisms (Wist 2000, Lervik 2014). The Norwegian residents of Indian origin are also covered in the last volume of a three-volume work on the history of immigration to Norway with less attention to particular causal mechanisms, but more attention to the wider historical process (Tjelmeland 2003, and Brochman 2003 in Kjeldstadli 2003c: 130, 215, 370, and also: 42, 68, 105, 151, 245). The authors build on secondary sources regarding the first wave of migration from India to Norway, both the pioneering socio-economic surveys (Bø 1979a, 1979b, 1980), and the early transnational social anthropology (Kramer 1979a, 1979b, 1980). Modern immigration from India and other non-Western countries is seen, in these three volumes in the context of all immigration to Norway throughout the entire history of the Norwegian state (Kjeldstadli 2003a, 2003b).

Finally, qualitative immigration research seems to be a rather coherent “discursive formation” or institutional arrangement, which has emerged out of social anthropological research on the first modern diasporas to Norway in the 1970s. The advances within this strand of research challenges “methodological nationalism” as a premise in social science research. With the exception of one singular study, with a “national romantic” concept of culture, the main thrust has been towards the rediscovery of pluralism within national communities (of origin as well as settlement), combined with the discovery of the actual pluralism of transnational diaspora communities

2.3 “Giving voice” to subaltern subjects

At the fringes of institutionalized social science are subjectivist gender studies and similar attempts at *giving voice* to subaltern persons themselves. As observed by quantitative immigration researchers, Norwegian residents of Indian origin include many middle class persons who are emphatically not subaltern. Nevertheless, even the Indian diaspora in Norway includes persons who have been mobilized by attempts to give voices to persons who find themselves in a marginalized social position because of gender, class, or simply because their skin color is associated with the old colonies.

First, some gender studies researchers has inquired into the life histories of young adults of South Asian origin, in order to understand arranged marriages (Bredal 2006). This study includes six persons of Indian origin (*ibidem*: 139). Theoretically, the author is sympathetic to a form of “third world” feminism that sees “cultures” as internally contested (*ibidem*: 299), and she certainly aims at *giving a voice* to her subjects. However, one might wonder if there might be some implicit cultural essentialism in her research design, which is to *observe* individual experiences about marriage practices that are *assumed* to be generally South Asian.

Second, some research within nursing and the health science has gathered a number of personal life histories about aging, social wellbeing and health among women who migrated from India to Norway

in the 1970s (Sharma 2009). The interviews are put into context by the researcher's own experience as a highly-educated Indian woman who has migrated to Norway, within the framework of an explorative or hypothesis-generative research design. This study is framed as health research, but it might also stand as gender research, because Madhu Sharma utilizes her particular standpoint as an epistemological resource, enabling her as a non-white woman to *give voice* to other non-white women with similar experiences.²

Third, some journalistic contributions, as academic works on gender or health, also aim at *giving voice* to human beings. One collection of edited life histories, including the stories of three Indians, was published after the first wave of labor immigration from the “third world” (Ytre-Arne 1986). One of the Indian youngsters who contributed to that book (Brenna 1986), would grow up to become an author of several books with a public voice. She also wrote about her personal experiences as an “immigrant woman” of Indian origin in Norway (Brenna 2012). These life histories revolve around issues of freedom and cultural conventions, similar to the aforementioned example of gender studies. Notably, Brenna (2012) is a Norwegian woman of Indian origin who grew up to speak for herself in public. Another autobiography of a younger woman of Indian origin was published the same year (Kaur 2012). Prableen Kaur is active in the Oslo Labor Party and local Sikh associations. She became famous in 2011, when she blogged about her experience as a survivor after the 22 July massacre, a right-wing extremist attack on children and youngsters in the Norwegian Labor Party (Kaur 2011). Both Kaur and Brenna are vocal and empowered women of color. It should also be noted that from 1994 until 2000 there was also a newspaper for and about Norwegian residents of Indian origin (*Immigrant times – Voice of Indian Immigrants*). This has been archived by the library of the University of Oslo, but it is written in a language that I cannot read.

Fourth, one may or may not consider it relevant to include personal experiences narrated in a more or less “fictional” format, which also, as with gender studies, health studies and journalistic contributions, can *give voice* to subjects. The “immigrant literature” in Western Europe includes a few books about what it means to be a Norwegian resident of Indian origin (Gill 2008, 2011; Naveen 2010). Judged as literature, such books may be rather didactic: though judged as science, their method might be hard to replicate. At least some of these novels (Gill 2008, 2011) can be defined within a specific tradition, namely social socialist realism, which is a method of artistic inquiry with defined esthetic and didactic criteria.

Finally, I will observe that these attempts to *give voice* to neglected subjects do not constitute a unified “discursive formation” or institutional arrangement. Rather, they are dispersed across various discursive practices. An explicit epistemological foundation for the usage of personal experience is found within academic gender studies, e.g. by the feminist epistemologist Karin Widerberg (1995). However, with regard to Norwegian residents of Indian origin, it is through health science that a non-white woman (Sharma 2009) speaks for non-white women like herself. In gender studies, meanwhile, a white woman (Bredal 2006) attempts to speak on behalf of non-white women. Outside academic discourse, some Indian-Norwegian woman also speak for themselves in journalistic pieces (Kaur 2011, 2012; Brenna 2012) and social realist literature (Naveen 2010). The point with feminist epistemology, however, is a combined attention to both subjective experience and objective environment. I certainly wonder whether Madhu Sharma's applied health science does not indicate a path for intersectional emancipatory efforts among Norwegian residents of Indian origin.

² With what words can we refer to persons who are targeted by racial discrimination – without using the terms of racial discrimination? *Racial discrimination* can be real, even though “races” are not real. This report uses the terms “non-white people” and “people of color”. These terms are awkward, but the alternatives may be even worse. (See also Chapters 5.2, footnote 4, and 5.7, footnote 5.)

2.4 Common denominators across three strands of research

For all three strands of social research that have been reviewed here, a common denominator is the attempt to serve emancipation, either via state policies, or via civil activism. I started by reviewing the research that is at the core of institutionalized policy, namely descriptive reports from Statistics Norway. These are based on official state registries, which are the product of state policies. I have concluded by reviewing the research at the fringe of institutionalized policy: the attempts to give voice to neglected subjects, not only through the social sciences, but also journalism and fiction, helps convey experiences that are autonomous of institutionalized science or politics. Between those two extremes, I have reviewed a wide range of studies of Norwegian residents of Indian origin.

For *quantitative immigration research*, the Norwegian residents of Indian origin are interesting as an example of particularly successful integration into the Norwegian middle class majority. The conditions are described by Statistics Norway, and explanations sought by academic research. Within *qualitative immigration research*, there has been a focus on transnational life histories which reveal complex social mobility within the Indian and Norwegian middle classes: in both countries research has brought to the surface a history of cultural pluralism and migration.

For *attempts at “giving voice” to subaltern subjects*, the Norwegian residents of Indian origin have received attention because women of South-Asian origin – women of color – seldom have a voice in the Norwegian public debate, and it is often assumed that they need help – or even patronage.

All three strands of research share a commitment to social welfare issues, rather than, for example, asking how labor migration may be beneficial for economic growth. Researchers are mainly interested in social marginalization versus social integration, in three categories class/caste, gender/sex and ethnicity/race. Some seek explanations in Marxist economism (e.g. Schou 2006) and some in “national-romantic” culturalism (e.g. Staurland 2012). However, most have moved towards a combination of neoliberal “choice” models with Marxist “structural” models. They, then, combine these economic models with refined cultural theories, reading family ties and religious associations as “social capital” (e.g. Sharma 2009; Wist 2000; Lervik 2014). There has been a significant progress in knowledge about Norwegian residents of Indian origin.

2.5 Further directions?

One possible further direction could be for social scientists to combine their commitment to social welfare with an interest in economic growth. That would not only be beneficial for the host country and for the country of origin. It might also potentially have an emancipatory effect on subaltern subjects. In particular, I would suggest more attention to geographically uneven development, within states as well as between them. In international law, development is a collective human right, which is relevant for emerging economies, and also, for marginalized groups within industrialized or developing countries.

In “*giving voice” to subaltern subjects*, it would be useful for the scholarship to pay more attention to how non-white women may experience racial and sexual discrimination. This discrimination may come in an open “hostile” form, but also in a well-intended “benevolent” form (Crenshaw 1999). Such intersectional sensitivity to the racism/sexism nexus is hardly visible in the research on Norwegian residents of Indian origin, with one exception: Madhu Sharma (2009), the only Indian woman among the authors, is also the only author to seriously address personal experiences of racism. Her health research might be seen as a materially oriented version of the intersectionality approach, which some cultural researchers have applied in the study of other diaspora communities in Norway (e.g. Berg, Flemmen and Gullikstad 2010; Sverdljuk 2013, 2014).

It may be relevant for *immigration research* (both *quantitative* and *qualitative*) to interpret contemporary labor immigration to Europe in the context of its past labor emigration; and similarly, to see the emerging economies of the present time in the context of colonially imposed

underdevelopment in the past. Norway not only has a long history of immigration (Kjeldstadli 2003a, 2003b, 2013c), but also a history of mass emigration (Østrem 2006). While some emigrated to America, others migrated internally, to indigenous Sámi areas under Norwegian control, which were re-defined as “Colonie” (Pedersen 1999). Colonial history helps us explain contemporary migration in several ways. In the context of *comparative history*, it is relevant that India, after its liberation from Britain, must overcome its own legacy of internal colonization (Routledge 1993). In the context of *transnational history*, it is relevant that some members of the Norwegian elite in fact emigrated to India, in order to serve the administration of Denmark-Norway’s colony Trankebar in south-east India (Feldbæk 1990). Researching migration within a context of uneven development helps emphasize the *socio-economic* aspect of a problematic where other critiques of immigration research have emphasized the *socio-cultural* side. The latter group consists of experts on “nation building”, as an open-ended process of making and maintaining communities. These researchers wonder why immigration researchers define minorities as the problem in isolation from the majority, though all minorities are defined as such in contrast to some majority. Thus, immigration research implicitly defines the host community in terms of popular political myths, rather than empirical knowledge (Bauböck 2008; Eriksen and Hoëm 1999). In the historical nation building process, the socio-cultural aspect was the making and maintenance of community – but the socio-economic aspect was geographically uneven development.

My suggestions build, in fact, on one specific school of Indian social science, which has produced fresh insights on: decolonization (Chakrabarty 2000); national disunity (Chatterjee 1996); and the voice of subaltern subjects (Spivak 1988). The main point is to widen the thematic scope of social sciences with Norwegian residents of Indian origin: the existing commitment to social welfare could be complimented with an interest in economic growth, with a background of geographically uneven economic development. Existing research has shown that Norwegian residents of Indian origin are relatively successful and consequently, that they tend to be resources rather than clients. Still, according to others, some members of this group may consider themselves to be marginalized. The distinction between success and subaltern position is not straightforward. An example. A woman from an upper caste with a university degree may find herself an immigrant, with a job she is overqualified for, experiencing discrimination, and fearing future widowhood, not knowing what to expect from the welfare state. Her situation would be relative deprivation, not poverty. There are several issues that remain under-documented regarding Norwegian residents of Indian origin, and consequently, there are segments within this group who lack a voice and attention within research and policy.

One issue that remains badly documented is the composition and origin of *the second peak of migration from India to Norway*, which took place just after 2000. We have much more detailed knowledge about the first wave of migration from India to Norway during the 1970s. One reason for this bias is simply that the first wave was smaller in number and more geographically concentrated. Consequently, it was possible to describe the diaspora as a whole by applying fieldwork methods of social anthropology. The latter wave is larger in number, and is more scattered in terms of region of settlement, and perhaps also region of origin. Since much of the second wave consists of highly-qualified workers in the petroleum industry, better knowledge about this diaspora matters. It would be of relevance for the affected individuals and families, but also for policy makers who are committed to capitalist growth and mutual “comparative advantages” between India and the European Economic Area.

Another issue that is poorly documented are the *remittances* sent from the Indian diaspora in Norway back to their community of origin in India. Statistics Norway gathers economic data about trade and business ownership that integrate Norway and India, and also various socio-economic integration indicators for the Indian diaspora as it joins the middle class majority in Norway. It gives, though, less attention to the transnational household of transnational family businesses. This may be seen as a state-and-market-bias, which overlooks the actual economic practices that are non-market and non-state. It may be significant, however, for economic development in regions like Punjab and minorities like the Indian diaspora. Better measurement of remittances sent from the Indian diaspora

back to India would be relevant not only for small business owners and for the transnational families themselves. It might also prove useful for policy makers who are committed to social liberal inclusiveness, regionally balanced development within and between nations, and the maintenance of social legitimacy for the Indian state and the European Economic Area.

3. History

This chapter presents a brief history of immigration from India to Norway (3.1), but also its context within long-term transnational history (3.2). This will allow for a discussion of the present historical situation of Norwegian residents of Indian origin (3.3). History is not merely a collection of facts, because the facts are presented in an order according to assumptions about how one thing leads to another. The present chapters contextualize the facts in order to provide understanding of causal interaction between transnational migrations, on the one hand, and geographically uneven development on the other. Such a perspective was suggested at the end of the literature review in the previous chapter.

3.1 Brief history: two waves of migration from India to Norway

There have been two significant waves of migration from India to Norway. The first wave was in the 1970s, and consisted mainly of labor migrants who found employment in the industrial or agricultural sectors. This started when Britain began to restrict immigration from India (a former colony), and some emigrants from India happened to end up in Norway (Wist 2000). Many of them came from the Indian Punjab, and settled in the Drammen urban region (Kramer 1979a; Wist 2000; Kjeldstadli 2003c; Tjelmeland 2003: 129). Chain migration included further arrivals through family reunification. The second wave began after 2000, and it consists mainly of labor migrants, who find work in the computing or engineering sector. Many of them have settled in Stavanger, the main hub for the Norwegian oil and gas industry (Pettersen 2009). Data are scarce about their area of origin in India. The first wave of migrants settled down with families, often using the opportunity for family migration. The second wave of migrants from India to Norway are often unmarried men, but they may not have had the time yet to settle down with families (*ibidem*). Immigration researchers frame the Norwegian residents of Indian origin as exceptionally successful, comparing them to other diasporas of non-Western origin (see e.g. Wist 2000; Lervik 2014a). The employment rate is high (see 5.2) and social problems barely feature (see 7.1). The children of immigrants from India are very likely to pursue higher education (see 5.4). Norwegian residents of Indian origin seem to have adapted a family pattern from the host nation (see 4.5); while at the same time maintaining ties to the extended family in their area of origin (see 5.6).

3.2 Historical context: geographically uneven development

Within what historical context is it more fruitful to understand the brief history of migration from India to Norway? The critical literature review concluded with a suggestion that contemporary migration should be understood in the context of the long-term fluctuations of transnational economic history: in particular the historical causes of geographically uneven development (2.5). Labor migration can potentially contribute to economic development, and takes place within a global situation of geographically uneven development. The fact that some regions are more prosperous than others may facilitate labor migration. Some might argue that labor migration should be seen as “brain drain”, which amplifies uneven development (Castles, Haas and Miller 2014: 32). Others may claim that labor migration facilitates “comparative advantages” of mutual benefit for the sending and the receiving country (*ibidem*: 30). Beyond these two ideological positions, a more empirical approach might find various points whereby transnational social capital in diaspora communities facilitate various forms of economic development (*ibidem*: 39-45, 53). For some similar positions in the

Norwegian policy debate, see Kjeldstadli (2003a: 123, 370-371). Some policy makers prefer the theory of “brain drain” while others choose that of “comparative advantages”. In any case, it is useful with empirical data about the long-term historical causes of geographically uneven development (external as well as internal colonialism).

External colonialism

In a long-term historical perspective, it may be relevant that there was once a flow of elite labor migration from Norway to Trankebar (probably better known as Chennai or Madras). This is because Trankebar was a colony of the Danish kingdom from 1620 until 1845, while Norway was a province of Denmark until 1814. Danish and Norwegian ships were an integrated part of global colonialism, transporting various goods, including slaves (Feldbæk 1990). Throughout the 1800s, Norway experienced a period of industrialization, urbanization and emigration, where the population surplus from the old agricultural economy either found new work in the towns, or sought new agricultural lands on the colonial frontiers. Thus, a considerable portion of the Norwegian population became labor immigrants in North America (Østrem 2006). This historical emigration is part of a larger pattern. In a long-term perspective, there have been two phases of global mass migration, both related to the long history of economic globalization: first the emigration from colonial Europe, later the immigration to post-colonial Europe (Hatton and Williamson 2005).

In Western Europe, including its Norwegian “semi-periphery”, the process of industrialization coincided with that of colonization. For a period, the Indian Subcontinent became a colony under Western European powers, mainly Britain. Sketching a rough panorama over global economic history, Wallerstein (1979: 26-27) claimed that during the colonial area, a previously established “Indian Ocean Proto-World Economy” became assimilated as a periphery within the emerging “West-European World Economy”. This view has found some confirmation in later research, when the details of the picture were filled in with a more empirical study of the historical documents (see e.g. Lieberman 2003). After independence from Britain in 1947, it took some decades before India returned to the global scene as a re-emerging economy. In global political economy, it now is one of the BRICS-countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South-Africa). These large national economies are now intensively industrializing. They are also re-emerging as global geopolitical players. One of the striking differences between the early industrialized and the late industrialized countries is that the West-European pioneers were industrializing during the era of West-European colonialism, whereas the BRICS-countries are now industrializing within a multi-centered geopolitical order. There is now a more developed framework of international law, and thus, the late industrializers may be choosing more civilized approaches than the colonialist savagery of the early industrializers. At the same time, underdevelopment in some regions is the historical outcome of a transnational history, which led to the present overdevelopment of other regions.

Internal colonialism

In explaining geographically uneven development, however, the external colonization of one area by another country may not be of more significance than the internal colonization of particular regions within a country. Internally in Western Europe, as well as internally in the Indian Subcontinent, there are ongoing efforts to overcome the internal colonial heritage. On the Indian side, one much debated case is the conflict over hydropower development in Narmada River (Routledge 1993). In Europe, the most central case may be the Sámi struggle for indigenous human rights, which was triggered by a conflict over hydropower development on the Alta River, Norway (Jensen 2013). In the Norwegian case, some of the labor force surplus during industrialization went to the colonial frontier in North America, while others settled in a similar frontier within Sámi areas, re-defined as “Colonie” (Pedersen 1999). This is a complex colonial history, including the emigration of Indigenous Sámi, some of whom engaged in reindeer husbandry with Native Americans (Jensen 2012). As a result, the history of internal and external colonialism has produced complex fragmentary nations in Europe, much as what Chatterjee (1996) observed in India. The ongoing efforts to overcome the colonial

heritage includes regional efforts towards more geographically inclusive development. According to international human rights law, the national minorities, indigenous peoples and tribal peoples enjoy the right to freedom from systematic discrimination or resource grabbing.

Contemporary outcome

As noted above, the early industrializers operated within a global context which was less regulated than that experienced by the late industrializers. The UN has imperfections but it does, at least, provide some international norms, as do other macro-regional cooperation efforts. Within international human rights law, what is of particular relevance for re-emerging economies as well as for developing internal regions, is the second half of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has been specified in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Jensen 2015: 45-46). The individual right to development includes a collective right to freedom from collectively imposed underdevelopment. Among macro-regional institutional arrangements, the European Union and the Indian federal state can both be seen as large-scale efforts to find shared solutions to shared problems. There are also some economic and political ties between these two large federations. The EU is India's largest trading partner, accounting for 20% of its trade, whereas India is the EU's eighth largest trading partner (Wikipedia 2015b). Consequently, transnational investments are also increasing. Since 2007, there have been efforts at establishing an India-EU free trade agreement, but these efforts have not yet been fruitful. India is not part of any military alliance, but its top strategic partners are Russia and the USA, before its three main EU trading partners: France, Britain and Germany (*ibidem*). Norway is a fully integrated partner of the inner EU market, the European Economic Area (EEA), but as a small country, Norway does not count among India's main trading partners in the EU/EEA.

3.2 Present historical situation for the Indian diaspora in Norway

Within this large theatre of economic and strategic geography, the relations between Norway and India account for a small fraction of transnational flows.

The Norwegian government has an official policy for multilateral cooperation with the Indian government, within the areas of energy/climate, economy, science/education and culture (Norwegian Ministries 2009). Consequently, the Norwegian government has funded research and education cooperation programs (SIU 2013; Norwegian Research Council 2015). Transnational commercial actors had long been dissatisfied with an old tax cooperation agreement between Norway and India, dating back to 1987, and in 2011, this was replaced by a new tax cooperation agreement (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 1987, 2011; Larsen 2011). Nevertheless, the economic ties between Norway and India remain comparatively small in volume. The two tables (1-2) below give some sense of Norway's economic integration with selected number of countries. Table 1 shows trade of goods, both import and export measured in Norwegian currency. Table 2 shows transnational business ownership structures, both Norwegian-controlled businesses abroad and foreign-owned businesses in Norway, measured by number of employees. Within both tables, the left side in both tables show economic ties between Norway and the various BRICS-countries. By contrast, in both tables, the right side of both tables show economic ties between Norway and some selected other countries: one neighboring Nordic country, three EU/EEA countries and one North-American country. As the tables show, the Norwegian economy has some degree of integration with the Indian economy, as also with other BRICS-countries, though it is clearly less integrated with South Africa, and clearly more integrated with China. Nevertheless, the selected countries on the right-hand side of the table illustrate that Norway still tends to be more integrated with other Nordic countries, with other West-European countries, and with North-American countries.

Table 1. Norwegian foreign trade, with selected countries.
Approximate monthly import/export, 2011-2012, in millions of Norwegian Kroner (NOK)

Country	Import	Export	Country	Import	Export
China	3,000	1,500	Sweden	5,200	5,000
Russia	950	500	Poland	1,000	1,000
Brazil	500	200	France	1,200	4,500
India	250	150	Britain	2,300	21,000
South-Africa	150	50	USA	1,600	3,000

Source: Statistics Norway 2014 (table 08803).

Table 2. Norway in transnational business ownership, ties with selected countries.
Norwegian-controlled businesses abroad or foreign-controlled businesses in Norway
(number of employees)

Country	Norway	Foreign	Country	Norway	Foreign
China	10,684	3,244	Sweden	45,551	83,352
Russia	4,873	25	Poland	11,075	927
Brazil	11,609	25	France	6,865	15,788
India	11,227	112	Britain	16,320	30,285
South-Africa	1,259	7	USA	22,428	49,153

Source: Statistics Norway 2014 (tables 09827 and 08086).

The description above shows the transnational economic context of Norwegian residents of Indian origin. There is a striking gap between, on the one hand, the comparatively small volume of the economic ties between India and Norway, and on the other, the fact that the Indian community in the country stands high among the various diaspora communities in Norway.

The second wave of migrants tend to find work as highly-qualified technical personnel within the geographical hub of the Norwegian oil industry (Pettersen 2009). Such labor migration may have a positive potential for policy makers whose primary concern is high tech industries that can generate large profits. It may not be unrealistic when some analysts hope for a “Silicon Valley” effect (see UKIERI 2012, cited in SIU 2012: 30-31). Such potentials fit with the above-mentioned policies from the Norwegian government, whose priority is to foster bilateral co-operation with India in technology and science with economic relevance.

The first wave of migrants, however, mostly found labor class jobs within industry and agriculture (Tjelmeland 2003: 129, cited by Pettersen 2009: 110). The early anthropological studies indicate that many of the first wave immigrants from India were over-qualified for these jobs. For further details, see Appendix 1. Most of the first wave immigrants from India established families, and became well integrated in the host nation, while remaining integrated with their local community of origin. Quite a few would pursue small business entrepreneurship (Wist 2000), and many of their children would pursue higher education within the health professions (Schou 2013). Such labor migration may be interesting for policy makers whose primary interest is to make economic globalization more socially inclusive: this includes the development of small transnational businesses and a high degree of participation in host country life. It would have been interesting to carry out a survey among small business entrepreneurs of Indian background regarding the perceived relevance of the Norwegian-Indian tax cooperation agreement. It might be that small and medium transnational businesses will experience the regulation as being helpful, but the opposite might also be possible. These small-scale entrepreneurs go largely unnoticed by social scientists, and they do not leave their mark in the official statistics (Wist 2000: 53), probably because they are hardly taken into account by the policy makers.

The present Norwegian coalition government might be relevant for the above-mentioned segments of the Indian diaspora in Norway, and *vice versa*. The political basis for this government is a Consortium of Cooperation between four parties in the Norwegian parliament (Brenne and Jensen 2013). They have a consensus on liberal norms, but interpret them differently. On one side, the Progress Party has promised further restriction on immigration from non-Western countries. This party is arguably happy that immigrants from India integrate well, but the party does not seem very relevant for any diaspora from a non-Western country. Then there is the Liberal Party and the Christian People's Party which emphasize social inclusiveness and small business entrepreneurship. The policies of these two parties would perhaps be beneficial for most of the "first wavers" and their offspring among Norwegian residents of Indian origin. In-between the two opposing blocks, the dominant Conservative Party is in favor of market liberalism and the import of highly qualified labor. This party may have policies that are more beneficial for the "second wavers" among Norwegian residents of Indian origin.

4. Demography

Detailed demographic figures for Norwegian residents of Indian origin are available from Statistics Norway, as are figures regarding all ethnic minorities in the country. This chapter starts by reviewing the number of Norwegian residents of Indian origin (4.1), then describes: changes in those numbers (4.2); the gender and age distribution (4.3); the geographical settlement pattern (4.4); and the typical family structures (4.5). The data in this chapter were all found in one report from Statistics Norway, which describes the settlement pattern of immigrants (and their offspring) from seventeen different countries of origin (Pettersen 2009). The geographical data, however, have been remixed by applying official categorization to regional urban clusters (Ministry of Municipalities 2002).

4.1 The number of Norwegian residents with Indian origin


In 2008, there were 8,500 persons in Norway who were either migrants from India, or born to parents from India. About one third of these were born in Norway by parents from India (Pettersen 2009: 109). The population of "Indian Norwegians" was formed by two waves of immigration from India to Norway, as described in the previous chapter. The first wave took place in the 1970s, and consisted mainly of young men from agrarian middle class in Indian Punjab, who found labor class jobs within agriculture or industry in the Drammen region (see e.g. Wist 2000; Kramer 1979). The second wave took off around 2005 and mainly consists of persons with high education, finding highly specialized occupations (Pettersen 2009: 109).

The migration flow from India to Norway is quantitatively small for the country of origin, which is a large federation. It is though quite considerable for the receiving country, which is a small nation-state. Statistics Norway counts the 8,500 residents of Indian origin as the *eighteenth largest* "group of immigrants" in Norway. Among the various "groups of immigrants", those with India as a country of origin have an unusually large proportion of members born in Norway to immigrant parents. Among residents born in Norway to immigrant parents, Indian immigrants constitute the *eighth largest group* (Pettersen 2009: 109). It must, however, be noted that Statistics Norway here defines "immigrant" as residents whose country of origin is in Asia, Africa, Latin-America, Oceania *except for* Australia and New Zealand, and finally, Europe *except* the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland) and the EU-15 (the first fifteen states of EU). Thus, for all practical matters, this definition of "immigrant" in fact *excludes* all immigrants from the European Economic Area, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, while *including* all migrants from post-colonial and post-socialist states (see also Pettersen 2009: 12, 109). Since much of the migration to Norway comes from those countries of origin that are excluded from the statistics, a figure that includes all immigration from all countries, would certainly show residents of Indian origin as ranking lower than the eighteenth largest group of immigrants.

4.2 Population increase over time

The population of Norwegian residents with Indian origin has increased over time. Statistics Norway has rather good figures regarding immigration to and emigration from India.

Figure 1. Volume of immigration India-Norway, and emigration Norway-India (absolute numbers)



Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 111 (Figure 7.1).

The figure give information about immigration to Norway from India, as well as emigration from Norway to India. How much of this constitutes circular migration remains unknown.

Immigration

Compared to other countries of origin, a rather large portion of the immigrants from India arrived to Norway before the Norwegian state introduced a general “immigration stop” in 1975.³ Among the earliest Indian immigrants, most came from the Indian Punjab, while Pakistani Punjab was the main area of origin for the Pakistani immigrants. Many of the immigrants from Punjab to Norway settled in Drammen, a small town outside Oslo, and were hired as untrained workers within industry and agriculture (Kjeldstadli 2003: 129, cited in Petersen 2009: 110). The first wave of labor migration implied a beginning to family migration as well, and the first wave peaked in 1987, a year when a total of 389 persons migrated from India to Norway. After that year, there was a steady decrease in emigration from India, which continued until 1996, when only 134 persons from India emigrated to Norway. After that year, there was a small increase. In 2005, there were 356 immigrants from India. Then the number nearly doubled the following year, with 564 persons in 2006, and then nearly doubled again, with 998 persons in 2007. Indeed, India was the fourth non-European country of origin for immigration to Norway in 2007 (Petersen 2009: 111).

Emigration

The registered figure of emigration from Norway to India is less reliable than the figure for immigration. This is because an émigré is not registered until he or she has changed officially registered address in Norway. In 1993, the figure shows a sudden jump in emigration, and this is not due to any substantial change, but only to an effort to tidy up the address registry (Henriksen 2008, cited in Pettersen 2009: 111). Additionally, there is a lack of data regarding how many of the émigrés from Norway to India, who were not of Indian origin, and how many were returnees. One may assume


³ The so-called “immigration stop” was, in fact, no full stop. See Chapter 6.2.1 in the present report.

that a considerable portion of the emigrants to India consists of earlier immigrants from India (or the children of immigrants). But we have not data for making estimates here.

4.3 Gender and age distribution

There is good data showing the age and gender distribution of Norwegian residents of Indian origin (immigrants as well as children of immigrants).


Figure 2. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by gender and age, absolute numbers, by 1 January 2008



Note. Yellow: immigrants. White: born in Norway by immigrant parents.

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 112 (Figure 7.2).

Figure 3. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by gender and age, percentages, by January 2008



Note. Yellow: immigrants. White: born in Norway by immigrant parents.

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 112 (Figure 7.3).

There might be slightly more men than women among Norwegian residents of Indian origin. The relative predominance of men over women is clear among the *elder age groups* (55-69 years of age), but not so much among the younger cohorts. The gender distribution among Norwegian residents of Indian origin is also clear among those who live in municipalities where most of the Indian immigrants *arrived during the second wave* (Stavanger, Sandefjord, Sandnes). There is, meanwhile, no such tendency in the municipalities that received the first wave of Indian immigrants (Oslo, Drammen, Lier, Nedre Eiker) (Pettersen 2009: 111).

It may seem contradictory that the gender difference is pronounced among the oldest age groups and in the municipalities that received the second wave of migration. I would suggest that this is due to a mechanism whereby much labor migration starts with a man, who is followed by a wife, who later has children (Kramer 1979a). There is an even number of men and women among the younger cohorts of residents of Indian origin: and also among those who are settled in municipalities where most of the immigration from India arrived early. According to Statistics Norway, this even gender distribution among the residents of Indian origin differs from the male preponderance, which is the general pattern among “immigrants”, and also within each country of origin other than India (Pettersen 2009: 111).

Similar seemingly contradictory patterns are found in the age distribution independently of gender. On the one hand, residents with Indian origin include c many persons above 50 years of age, on the other, the same group also includes comparatively many persons below the age of twenty. As many as *one out of four* in this group are *above 50* years of age (*ibidem*), a number that stands in striking contrast to the median age of 35 among all residents who are classified as “immigrants” by Statistics Norway. At the same time, *three out of four* are *below 20* years of age in the same group. This is a rather large proportion, compared to other categories of immigrants (including offspring). The relatively large ratio of persons above 50 *and* below twenty may be explained in various ways. It has been suggested that this reflects the two waves of migration (Pettersen 2009: 113). The first wave of migration would explain much of the ratio for the group below twenty, as well as for the one above 50. As mentioned above, among the various “immigrants groups” in Norway, those with India as a country of origin have an unusually large proportion of members born within Norway to immigrant parents (see also Pettersen 2009: 109).

4.4 Geographical settlement pattern

There is good data regarding the geographical settlement pattern for residents in Norway of Indian origin (immigrants and children of immigrants). This population group is clustered in relatively few municipalities. Norway has 430 municipalities, but only 187 have residents of Indian origin (either as immigrants or children of immigrants). Of these, only ten municipalities have more than one hundred residents of Indian origin (Pettersen 2009: 109).

Table 3 shows the top twenty municipalities for residents of Indian origin. This has been taken from my main source, a report from Statistics Norway (Pettersen 2009).

Table 4 shows the same municipalities sorted according to clusters of urban settlements, which include several municipalities. This table I have compiled by taking data from the above-mentioned table. However, I have sorted them according to another statistical categorization, the so-called “metropolitan regions” of Norway (Ministry of Municipalities 2002; see also Wikipedia 2015a; 2015c for information in English).

**Table 3. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by municipality, by 1 January 2008
(number and percent)**

	Antall				Prosent norskfødte med inn- vandrer- foreldre av innvandrere og norsk- fødte med innvandrer- foreldre samlet	Prosent av befolkningen			Prosent av hele landet		
	Befolk- ningen i alt	Innvand- rere og norskfødte med inn- vandrer- foreldre	Inn- vandrer- e	Norsk- fødte med inn- vandrer- foreldre		Innvand- rere og norskfødte med inn- vandrer- foreldre	Inn- vandrer- e	Norsk- fødte med inn- vandrer- foreldre	Innvand- rere og norskfødte med inn- vandrer- foreldre	Inn- vandrer- e	Norsk- fødte med inn- vandrer- foreldre
Hele landet ...	4 737 199	8 484	5 849	2 635	31	0,2	0,1	0,1	100,0	100,0	100,0
Oslo	560 123	3 407	2 295	1 112	33	0,6	0,4	0,2	40,2	39,2	42,2
Drammen	60 138	594	357	237	40	1,0	0,6	0,4	7,0	6,1	9,0
Bergen	247 732	476	342	134	28	0,2	0,1	0,1	5,6	5,8	5,1
Stavanger	119 576	364	341	23	6	0,3	0,3	0,0	4,3	5,8	0,9
Bærum	108 109	277	223	54	19	0,3	0,2	0,0	3,3	3,8	2,0
Asker	52 906	237	161	76	32	0,4	0,3	0,1	2,8	2,8	2,9
Trondheim ...	165 182	222	169	53	24	0,1	0,1	0,0	2,6	2,9	2,0
Lier	22 698	212	131	81	38	0,9	0,6	0,4	2,5	2,2	3,1
Lørenskog ...	31 846	199	135	64	32	0,6	0,4	0,2	2,3	2,3	2,4
Skedsmo	46 140	189	103	86	46	0,4	0,2	0,2	2,2	1,8	3,3
Nedre Eiker ..	22 092	157	86	71	45	0,7	0,4	0,3	1,9	1,5	2,7
Fredrikstad ..	71 974	117	74	43	37	0,2	0,1	0,1	1,4	1,3	1,6
Tønsberg	38 390	105	61	44	42	0,3	0,2	0,1	1,2	1,0	1,7
Oppegård	24 200	100	64	36	36	0,4	0,3	0,1	1,2	1,1	1,4
Kristiansand ..	78 908	95	68	27	28	0,1	0,1	0,0	1,1	1,2	1,0
Sandefjord ...	42 331	87	73	14	16	0,2	0,2	0,0	1,0	1,2	0,5
Sandnes	62 023	85	73	12	14	0,1	0,1	0,0	1,0	1,2	0,5
Frogn	14 245	81	49	32	40	0,6	0,3	0,2	1,0	0,8	1,2
Nittedal	20 253	74	45	29	39	0,4	0,2	0,1	0,9	0,8	1,1
Ullensaker ...	26 927	70	38	32	46	0,3	0,1	0,1	0,8	0,6	1,2

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 109 (Table 7.1).

Table 4. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, percentage per urban regions


Oslo Region	66%
<i>Oslo proper</i>	40%
<i>Greater Oslo</i>	14%
Northern sector	6%
<i>Lørenskog</i>	2%
<i>Skedsmo</i>	2%
<i>Nittedal</i>	1%
<i>Ullensaker</i>	1%
Southern sector	2%
<i>Oppegård</i>	1%
<i>Frogn</i>	1%
Western sector	6%
<i>Bærum</i>	3%
<i>Asker</i>	3%
<i>Drammen Region</i>	12%
Drammen	7%
Nedre Eiker	2%
Lier	3%
Bergen	6%
Stavanger Region	5%
<i>Stavanger</i>	4%
<i>Sandnes</i>	1%
Sattelites to Oslo Region	4%
<i>Fredrikstad</i>	1%
<i>Tønsberg</i>	1%
<i>Kristiansand</i>	1%
<i>Sandefjord</i>	1%
Trondheim	3%

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 110.

Note: definitions of urban regions from: Ministry of Municipalities (2002).


The largest proportion of residents of Indian origin (immigrants and their children) is settled within several clusters in the Oslo Region (66%). An independent cluster is found in Bergen, the second largest city of Norway (6%). Then, there are clusters of residents of Indian origin settled in the Stavanger Region, an area that has grown much because of offshore petroleum industry (5%). Apart from that, there are some smaller clusters settled in towns within the regional network of roads and rails leading from the Oslo Region (4%), and one rather large cluster in the university town of Trondheim (3%). None of the municipalities in Northern Norway has any significant number of residents with Indian origin.

Figure 4. Immigrants from India, by gender and municipality, by 1 January 2008 (%)




Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 113 (Figure 7.4).

Figure 5. Immigrants from India, by age and municipality, by 1 January 2008 (%)



Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 113 (Figure 7.5)

Figure 6. Immigrants from India, by duration of residence and municipality, by 1 January 2008 (%)

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 114 (Figure 7.6).

Municipal-specific figures regarding the age and gender of residents of Indian origin (immigrants and their children) reveal much information about how the geographical settlement pattern has been shaped by historical waves of migration.

First, the three municipalities Drammen, Lier and Nedre Eiker – all situated in the Drammen Region, within the larger Oslo Region – have the *largest proportions* of inhabitants of Indian origin. (This means, the percentage of the total number of inhabitants in the municipality of Indian origins, either as immigrants or children of immigrants). Furthermore, these three municipalities are the ones with the *largest* concentration of *children* born of immigrants from India (Pettersen 2009: 109). In these municipalities there are *hardly any* children or youngsters who have *themselves* migrated from India to Norway (*ibidem*: 113). These observations indicate that Drammen, Lier and Nedre Eiker are the municipalities with the largest proportion of Indians who are the longest established in the country. The first wave of industrial and agricultural labor migrants from India tended to settle in the Drammen Region, so this squares with the history of Indian migration to Norway.

Second, the municipality of Stavanger has *very few* inhabitants who are *children of immigrants* from India (*ibidem*: 110). On the other hand, Stavanger, with Sandnes and Sandefjord, are the three municipalities with the *largest* concentration of *children* who have *themselves migrated* together with their parents (*ibidem*: 113). In Stavanger and Sandnes, hardly any children or youngsters are Norwegian-born children of Indian immigrants. As previously mentioned, there are also more men than women among residents of Indian origin within these three municipalities. These numbers indicate that Stavanger, Sandnes and Sandefjord are the municipalities that have received the most Indian immigrants from the second wave of migration (*ibidem*: 110). I cannot explain why this is the case for Sandefjord, which is a town on the Southern Coast. However, it makes lots of sense for Stavanger and Sandnes, which both belong to the innovative Stavanger Region, where much of the Norwegian oil industry is based.

Additionally, it may be noted that among residents of Indian origin in Trondheim (about 3% of the total number of residents of Indian origin in Norway) there is a rather high proportion who have arrived in the recent wave, and for the sake of education (Pettersen 2009: 115). This town is known for its advanced education in engineering.


Finally, Statistics Norway comments that all registered “immigrant groups” typically tend to settle in and around the capital city in the Oslo Region. What is unusual for Norwegian residents of Indian origin (when compared to immigrant families from other countries) is that there are very few who have settled in Østfold County to the southeast of Oslo, and in Tromsø, the largest town of Northern Norway (Pettersen 2009: 110).

Overall, we have rather good information about the waves of migration that has produced the geographical settlement pattern, and I have suggested some plausible explanations above. The clustering in the Oslo Region is a general pattern for most immigrants to Norway (from post-colonial or post-socialist countries). Within this, the clustering around the Drammen Region is a result of the specificities of the first wave of migration from India to Norway: workers, mainly from Punjab, found opportunities, in and around Drammen. For the cluster in Bergen, I have not found any explanations; however, this is the second largest town in the country. Regarding the cluster in the Stavanger Region and the small cluster in Trondheim, both are results of the second wave of migration, with highly-qualified labor migrants settling within the main technical innovation belt in Norway, and education migrants going to the main technical university in the country. Finally, the tiny Indian communities found in Sandefjord and other small towns along the roads from the Oslo Region may have ended up there as a spillover effect, from the settlement in the Oslo Region. This could be tested with further study.

4.5 Family structure


Family patterns among Norwegian residents of Indian origin (immigrants and their children) are rather similar to the family patterns among Norwegian residents in general. Additionally, the family patterns among residents of Indian origin tend to vary between different municipalities, according to the above-mentioned geographical settlement distribution and historical waves of migration.

Figure 7. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by number of persons in the household, and municipality, by 1 January 2008 (%)




Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 116 (Figure 7.8).

Figure 8. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by household type and municipality, by 1 January 2008 (%)



Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 117 (Figure 7.9).

Figure 9. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, by civil status and municipality, by 1 January 2008 (%)



Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 117 (Figure 7.10).

Within Norway as a whole, the residents of Indian origin have a somewhat *lower* ratio of *one-person households* than the general Norwegian population, whereas the register ratio of *large-households* (five or more persons) is somewhat *higher* among the residents of Indian origin. These tendencies are typical of “immigrant” groups (and their children), according to Statistics Norway (that is, immigrants

from post-colonial or post-socialist states). For example, when compared to residents of Pakistani origin, those of Indian origin have a much smaller ratio of large-households: 60% for Pakistani-Norwegians; 20% for Indian-Norwegians; and about 15% for Norwegian residents in general. This indicates that residents of Indian origin tend to make choices for household size and form that are aligned to the general Norwegian population, rather than the typical pattern among those residents who are classified as “immigrants” (or children of immigrants). However, when it comes to marriage age, there is a quite different pattern. In the general Norwegian population, *one third* of the adults are married, while among the residents who are classified by Statistics Norway as “immigrants”, *four fifths* of the adults are married, and finally among residents of Indian origin, as many as *three quarters* of adults are married. Thus, the residents of Indian origin are much more likely to be married when compared to the general Norwegian population, and this is the case even when compared to other residents who are registered as “immigrants” by Statistics Norway (that is, immigrants from post-colonial or post-socialist states). (The numbers are from Statistics Norway, and they are presented in Pettersen 2009: 116-7).

Within various geographical clusters, the Norwegian residents of Indian origin tend to live in registered households of various sizes and forms, and there are a varying number of unmarried adults. Here there is the question of whether Indian-Norwegians in a particular region arrived during the first or the second wave of migration.

In the municipalities with many well-established families of Indian origin, there tend to be fewer one-person households, and more large-households (five or more members). The figure showing the types of household indicate that these large-household tend to be classified by Statistics Norway as households with “several families” (Pettersen 2009: 116-117). Statistics Norway has no concept of extended families, only nuclear families (parents with children), and we might assume that some of these households consist of extended families (parents with children, and maybe grandparents or cousins with their children, etc.). This pattern is the rule among residents of Indian origin settled in the Oslo Region, including Oslo Proper, the Northern Sector (Lørenskog, Skedsmo, Nittedal, Ullensaker), the Southern Sector (Oppegård, Frogn), and the Drammen Region (Drammen, Lier, Nedre Eiker). Notably, however, the inhabitants of Indian origin who live in the Western Sector (Bærum, Asker) of the Oslo Region are an exception to this rule. Here there are more one-person households, and fewer large-households. The reason for this exception to the pattern is unknown.

In the municipalities with many newcomers and newly-established families of Indian origin, there are very few large-households, and considerably more single-person households (*ibidem*). Among the Norwegian-Indians, the highest ratio of single-person households is found in Stavanger municipality, the main hub of technological innovation in the country. The second largest ratio is in the Sandefjord municipality, whereas the third largest is in Trondheim. Notably, in the municipalities in the Western part of the larger Oslo (Bærum, Asker) the residents of Indian origin actually have a higher ratio of one-person households than their compatriots settled in the suburb of Stavanger (Sandnes). Most of these municipalities are known for having received a relatively large proportion of the second wave immigrants from India (with the notable exception of Bærum and Asker). One might expect that the ratio of unmarried adults would vary across municipalities in a similar way to the ratio of one-person households. This is because (as mentioned above) it is known that residents of Indian origin are much more likely to choose marriage over cohabitation, when compared to the general Norwegian population. This is, *indeed*, the case for Trondheim municipality, where most of the residents of Indian origin are students, who have emigrated, for the sake of university education. However, the *second* largest ratio of unmarried residents of Indian origin is found in Bergen (the second largest city in Norway), whereas the *third* largest ratio is in Oslo (the largest city in Norway). It may be that the ratio of unmarried persons are due to a general “urbanism effect”, whereby young couples choose unregistered cohabitation rather than early marriage. But this is an empirical question. The *fourth* largest ratio is found in Bærum municipality in the Western Sector of the Oslo Region. Finally, only the *fifth* largest ratio of unmarried residents of Indian origin is in Stavanger, a city that is known for

receiving a relatively large proportion of second wave labor migrants. Within these two municipalities, a large proportion of residents of Indian origin, arrived there recently, during the second wave of migration (see figures in 4.4 above).

Family patterns among the children of immigrants

The children of immigrants from India have a slighter higher tendency to choose marriage, rather than cohabitation, when compared to the general Norwegian population. Thus, the children of immigrants from India fit into a general pattern among immigrants from postcolonial and post-socialist countries, whereas the children of immigrants from the European Economic Area, USA, Canada, Australia and New-Zealand tend to follow the same pattern as the average Norwegian population. It should be noted that the statistics includes registered cohabitation, but cohabitating couples who have not registered are counted as single persons (Wiik 2014, see the summary).

5. Socio-economic integration

Accurate socio-economic figures for Norwegian residents of Indian origin are available for certain topics, in particular for issues of relevance for “socio-economic integration”. With this term, I mean social democratic policies aimed at the socio-economic inclusion of all residents into the middle class majority in the country, regardless of the individual’s class background, gender or ethnicity. The present chapter will start by addressing the socio-economic integration of the Indian immigrants into the Norwegian host community. It will, then, proceed to discuss how the diaspora community might contribute to international socio-economic integration between Norway and India.

Based on official registries at Statistics Norway, the present chapter provides accurate figures regarding: the motivation for migration (5.1); labor force participation (5.2); occupation by economic sector (5.3); education among labor migrants, family migrants and their offspring (5.4); education among student migrants (5.5); and finally, marriage patterns (5.6). These issues may roughly be dealt with along with the socio-economic integration of the immigrant into the host community.


The chapter will then proceed by discussing some socio-economic issues for which no accurate figures exist. The discussion will apply published qualitative research, which is, by its nature, explorative and hypothesis-generative. Issues like remittances, caste background or gender/race discrimination may not be impossible to measure, but there is no system in place for systematic registration. The chapter will conclude by presenting the relevant qualitative research regarding: gender and migration (5.7); regarding caste and migration (5.8); and finally, remittances and social ties in India (5.9). Such issues may be characterized as questions of international socio-economic integration between different nations.

This report will return to the issue of *socio-economic* integration in chapter 7. There we will discuss linguistic skills and other forms of *socio-cultural* integration.

5.1 Migration type

Migration from India to Norway is mostly either labor migration, or migration for family unification, as an indirect result of the labor migration.

Figure 10. Immigrants from India, by reason for migration and municipality of settlement, by 1 January 2008 (%)



Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 115 (Figure 7.7).

One should note that in this figure, “immigrant” is everyone who is not a citizen of a Nordic country (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland).

For the first wave of migration from India to Norway, the statistical figures say nothing about the reasons for migration, because such information was not gathered before 1990. However, we know from the historical literature that the first wavers were a certain kind of labor migrants: these were industrial and agricultural workers, mainly from Punjab, settling, above all, in Drammen (Kramer 1979a; Wist 2000; Kjeldstadli 2003c; Tjelmeland 2003: 129). The absolute number of migrants was so small that the historical account gives a reliable account of the process.

For the second wave of migration, the statistical figures are much more accurate. They show that the vast majority of Indian immigrants came *to work*: only half as many came for *family unification*, a smaller proportion for *education*, and a few for *asylum*.

The statistical figures have little information for immigrants who arrived before 1990. These figures do not include individual-level information about the reasons for migrating to Norway. The “first wavers” constitute a rather large proportion of the immigrants going from India to Norway, because the first wave of migration took place early on.

Regarding geographical settlement patterns, Statistics Norway notes that the highest proportions of immigrants from India are to be found in Stavanger/Sandnes and Sandefjord: these are the two clusters that have received most second wavers, and there has, thus, been less time for labor migrants to form families. Likewise, there are rather few who were registered as labor migrants (after 1990) in Drammen, Lier and Nedre Eiker, the three municipalities that received most first wavers.

5.2 Labor force participation

As a result of the political debate about the “integration” of migrants, there is an urgent need for Statistics Norway to register socio-economic marginalization among “immigrants” groups (immigrants from post-colonial or post-socialist states). *Labor force participation* is an important indicator, and the figures are interpreted in the context of other indicators, such as the *self-support*, and *education* level. It should be noted that the labor force figures in fact include two sub-categories:

- persons who are *employed* (either as wage earners or self-employed);
- persons who are registered as *unemployed* (as a potential labor reserve).

For a more detailed explanation, see e.g. Pettersen (2009: 31). Thus, the measurement of the labor force excludes persons who are registered as being unavailable for paid work, for example, housewives, voluntary workers, and other services in the informal economy. Most Norwegian residents are registered as being employed.

Table 5. Labor force participation among immigrants from India, ages 25-54, by gender and municipality, fourth quarter of 2007, numbers and percentages

	Antall		Prosent		
	Befolkning 25-54 år	Innenfor arbeidsstyrken		Utenfor arbeidsstyrken	Registrerte arbeidsledige av arbeidsstyrken
		Sysse- satte	Registrerte arbeidsledige		
Hele landet	1 962 973	84	1	15	2
Menn	999 906	87	1	12	2
Kvinner	963 067	81	1	17	2
Innvandrere	180 029	65	5	30	7
Menn	90 430	73	5	23	6
Kvinner	89 599	58	5	37	9
India	4 125	69	3	28	4
Menn	2 168	75	2	23	2
Kvinner	1 957	63	4	33	6
Oslo	1 638	70	3	27	5
Menn	843	72	2	26	3
Kvinner	795	67	5	28	7
Bergen	251	68	3	29	4
Menn	127	76	2	21	3
Kvinner	124	60	3	37	5
Stavanger	246	65	1	33	2
Menn	178	82	1	17	1
Kvinner	68	22	1	76	6
Drammen	243	70	2	28	2
Menn	107	77	1	22	1
Kvinner	136	65	2	33	3
Bærum	159	62	3	36	4
Menn	80	65	1	34	2
Kvinner	79	58	4	38	6
Trondheim	127	71	0	29	0
Menn	74	80	0	20	0
Kvinner	53	58	0	42	0
Asker	103	65	3	32	4
Lørenskog	95	82	2	16	3
Lier	95	75	4	21	5
Skedsmo	74	80	1	19	2
Nedre Eiker	63	73	3	24	4
Sandefjord	51	76	2	22	3
Fredrikstad	54	76	4	20	5
Sandnes	51	57	2	41	3

Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 119 (Table 7.2).

Let us first ignore gender differences, while comparing the Norwegian residents of Indian origin, with Norwegian residents from all non-western diasporas, and finally, with the Norwegian population at large. After having made this comparison, I will proceed to make similar comparisons for men and women within the three categories. Thereafter, we will zoom in on Norwegian-born children of Indian

immigrants, and finally, I will give some critical considerations regarding the conceptual validity and the policy relevance of this research.

- Among the *general population*, well above 84% are formally *employed* (and 1% are formally *unemployed*).
- However, among the “*immigrant*” *residents* (from post-colonial or post-socialist states), about 65% are formally *employed* (while 5% are formally *unemployed*). There is as much as a nineteen percentiles difference.
- For *residents who have migrated from India*, the level of registered *employment* is 69%, (with 3% registered *unemployed*). This is, thus, only a little bit higher than the ratio among all residents registered as “immigrants”. For this particular group of immigrants, the difference from the population at large is fifteen percentiles (whereas the difference from the total ratio among residents classified as “immigrant” is four percentiles).

Thus, there is a clear statistical difference in the formal employment level between: (a) the population at large, which has a high ratio of employment; and (b) immigrant residents from post-colonial or post-socialist states, who have a considerably lower employment ratio. The latter group then includes residents who have migrated from India. The statistical difference is partly – but not fully – due to how *gender differences* vary across the mentioned statistical categories (Pettersen 2009: 119).

- *All residents, by gender*: As a result of a history of social democratic policies in Norway, the employment ratio for the general population is nearly equal for men and women (though there still is a slight bias towards men among the employed). Among the population as a whole, the 84% of formal *employment* can be broken down into 87% for men and 81% for women. There is thus only six percentiles difference between men and women. (The rate of registered *unemployment* is 1% for both men and women. Thus the total work force is 88% for all men and 82% for all women, and the difference is six percentiles.)
- *Residents with “immigrant” origin, by gender*: The pattern is different among residents who are registered as “immigrants”. Among this statistical category, there is a significantly larger difference between the genders, with more women being registered either as unemployed or as outside the labor force. Among “immigrant” residents, the ratio of formal *employment* at 65% can be broken down into 73% for men and 58% for women, a fifteen percentiles difference. This gender difference is considerably larger than the gender difference among the general population (six percentiles). (The rate of registered *unemployment* among all “immigrants” is 5% for both men and women. The total work force thus is 78% for male “immigrants”, 63% for female ones, and the difference is fifteen percentiles.)
- *Immigrants from India, by gender*: For residents who have migrated from *India*, the total ratio of 69% formal *employment* can be broken down into 75% for men and 63% for women: this makes a difference of twelve percentiles between women and men. This gender difference is a little bit less than the gender difference among all residents registered as “immigrants” (15 percentiles). However, the gender difference among Indian immigrants is smaller if we include the figures of registered *unemployment*. It should be remembered that persons who choose to *register* as being unemployed have made an effort to be available for paid work. Thus, the work force includes registered *unemployment* as well as registered employment. Among *women* who have migrated from India, the registered total work force is $63\% + 4\% = 67\%$. Among the *men* who have migrated from India, the total work force is $75\% + 2\% = 77\%$. The difference between male and female work force is $77\% - 67\%$ or ten percentiles. Thus, the gender difference among Indian immigrants is considerably less than what is observed regarding all registered “immigrants” (fifteen percentiles) though it is still higher than the gender difference among the general population (six percentiles).

Registered employment can be taken to indicate economic integration. At that point, the gaps between the various statistical categories may be interpreted as showing multiple (intersecting) forms of social stratification.

1. First, there is a gender gap between men and women in the population.
2. Second, there is an ethnic gap between the general population and those of “immigrant” residents (from post-colonial or post-socialist states).
3. Third, there is a gap between how the gender difference operates among the population at large, and among “immigrants” (from post-socialist or post-colonial countries).

How we interpret the observed statistical differences is largely dependent on the choice of explanatory model. From the viewpoint of postcolonial feminism, one may suspect that we have here a combination of gender discrimination and racial discrimination, inherited from historical colonialism and the patriarchy. From the viewpoint of cultural structure-functionalism, gender equality is perhaps a specifically western value, and migrants are navigating through culturally undefined situations of anomie. My suggestion is that interpretations from the latter explanatory model will be fruitful only if we do not look away from the interpretations implied in the former explanatory model.

Employment among children of Indian immigrants in Norway

Only one fifth of the Norwegian-born children of Indian immigrants have grown old enough to participate in the work force. If we look at the unusually high proportion within this group who are seeking higher education (see part 5.4), the groups also have a strikingly high degree of workforce participation. Within the relevant age group, the entire Norwegian population has a registered employment rate of 78% (with a registered unemployment of 2%), whereas in the statistical category “Norwegian-born with immigrant parents”, the registered rate of employment is somewhat smaller, 74% (with 3% registered unemployment). Also, the children of Indian immigrants have a registered employment rate of 74% (with 2% registered unemployment of). However, as Statistics Norway points out, these numbers should be understood in the context of higher education rates within the same age group. The rate of higher education among “immigrant” children is significantly *lower* than that of the same age group among the general population: while the children of Indian immigrants have a considerably *higher* rate of higher education than the general population. Therefore, it is striking that Indian immigrant children also have a high rate of registered employment. Statistics Norway concludes, that Norwegian-born children of Indian immigrants are exceptionally well integrated (Pettersen 2009: 121).

Critical considerations

To better interpret the figures on registered labor force participation it may be useful to offer some considerations over conceptual validity and policy relevance. As stated initially, this measure is frequently interpreted as an indicator of the degree of socio-economic integration versus marginalization. Thus, we use the measure of one empirical quantity as an indicator of another more theoretical concept. Such indicators may have their limitations, which also set limits on the interpretation. *First*, there is a the definition of “immigrant” is debatable, especially when we define the word as being all immigrants from non-Western countries. With this category, one is lumping together very different individuals (Henriksen 2007), and at the same time, one draws a distinction between this plurality, and another plurality, namely immigrants from Western countries. A highly-educated Indian or Moroccan may find him or herself classed together with traumatized child soldiers from the Horn of Africa (Mokhtarri 2007). It is striking that official publications from Statistics Norway, such as the above mentioned demographic report (Pettersen 2009), avoid politically laden concepts such as “immigrant from developing country”, “immigrant from post-colonial country”, or


even “people of color”.⁴ Nevertheless, the statistical agency chooses a specific definition of “immigrant”, which gains public relevance from a highly political debate. By uncritical usage of this definition of “immigrant” one runs the risk of contributing to the reproduction of doxa. *Second*, one can also discuss the implicit definition of economy. This measurement may be useful for identifying how housewives and informal workers are excluded from paid labor and regulated contracts. However, it is useful to gain knowledge about what might be going on with collective efforts in the family, production for direct consumption, and gift-exchanges: all practices that have been significant for many housewives and peasants around the globe. The policy goal of integrating everyone into paid work is certainly well intended. However, this goal could be criticized for gender as well as ethnic bias, because it does not recognize the many unpaid activities that are crucial for subsistence. This is an example of how social-democratic or socialist policies face complex challenges when dealing with the intersection between class, gender, and ethnicity. I will return to these issues below, with regard to integration into the transnational Indian diaspora: family (5.6), gender (5.7), caste (5.8), remittances (5.9) and cultural practices (7.2-7.3). If we keep the limitations in mind, participation in the formalized labor market is certainly a relevant indicator of socio-economic inclusion.

5.3 Occupation by economic sector

Most Norwegian employees are occupied in the tertiary sector, including both wage earners and the self-employed. In 2007, 76% among the general Norwegian population, and *as much as* 78% for “immigrants” (that is, immigrants from post-colonial or post-socialist states) worked in the tertiary sector. For immigrants from India, the ratio was *still higher*, at 90%. For Norwegian-born children of the Indian immigrants, I have not found any figures regarding occupation by economic sector.

Some geographical variety can be observed. Among Norwegian residents who have migrated from India, the ratio employed in the tertiary sector is *well above* 90% in Oslo and Bergen (the two largest cities in the country). It is *well below* 90% in Drammen and Stavanger (two main towns for settlement of the first and second wave of migration, respectively). For other municipalities, the number of immigrants from India is too low for any variety to be statistically significant.

Figure 11. Employed immigrants from India, ages 25-54, by economic sector and municipality, fourth quarter of 2007 (%)



Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 122 (Figure 7.15).

⁴ *Racial discrimination* can be real, even though “races” are not real. With what words may we refer to the persons who are targeted by racial discrimination, without using the terminology of racism? This report uses the terms “non-white people” and “people of color”. These are awkward terms, but the alternatives may be even worse. (See also Chapters 2.3 and 5.7.)

Only a few Norwegian residents work in the secondary sector (industries), and even fewer in the primary sector (agriculture, fisheries, forestry, herding, hunting and gathering). This is striking since Norway's main export products are oil, gas and fish. The numbers from 2007 show that only a small fraction of the Norwegian population was employed in the *primary* sector. The ratio was about half of that fraction for the segment of the population who were defined as "immigrant", and the same is the case for immigrants of Indian origin. However, some interesting differences are found between Indian immigrant communities settled in different municipalities of Norway. Oslo and Bergen, virtually *no* immigrants from India had an occupation in the *primary* sector. These are the municipalities where *more* than 10% of the Indian immigrants were occupied in the *tertiary* sector. However, there is a notable difference between Stavanger and Drammen, the two municipalities where *less* than 10% of the Indian immigrants worked in the *tertiary* sector. In Stavanger, virtually *no* Indian immigrants worked in the *primary* sector, leaving a relatively *larger portion* occupied in the *secondary* (industrial) sector. In Drammen, however, the Indian immigrants who worked outside the tertiary sector were evenly distributed between the *secondary* (industrial) and *primary* sectors. The number of individuals within these categories is too small to give statistically significant results, but nevertheless, the differences do make sense in the context of historical data (see part 4.4). Stavanger has received many second-wavers, and this town is the hub for the Norwegian oil and gas industry. Drammen, by contrast, had received many first-wavers, most of whom came from agricultural areas in Punjab, and they found their first jobs within industry and agriculture, both of which were traditional in the Drammen Region (Kramer 1979a; Kjeldstadli 2013c: 129). These ratios for occupation by economic sector can, then, be explained as a historical product of a specific process, but within this process, pure chance may have played a role in determining that Drammen would become the destination of chain migration from Punjab.

It should be noted that the measures of occupation by economic sector does not in itself say anything about class position, social status or income level. Increased globalization has led to most industrial production being moved from early-industrialized countries to emerging economies. Thus, the industrial proletariat is small within the so-called post-industrial economies. But, nevertheless, their large service sector include jobs that are precarious, low paid, providing little control over the means of production, and low social status. Some figures indicate that a considerable proportion of immigrants, including Indian immigrants, experience relative deprivation by being overqualified and underpaid in their present jobs (Bjørnstad and Barstad 2014). This brings us to the next issue: education.

5.4 Education among labor and family migrants and their offspring


There exist precise figures regarding the educational behavior of the various diaspora communities in Norway (see e.g. Pettersen 2009), however, there has been no systematic registration of the education immigrants have pursued *previous* to their arrival in Norway (Steinkellner 2012a). Therefore, the figures provide accurate information only about age cohorts that are so young that they cannot have brought any education from the country of origin. Therefore, in the following, I will first present findings from analysis of data about the young among the Norwegian residents of Indian origin. Thereafter, I will turn to the immigrants from India to Norway, of all ages, but excluding the children of immigrants.

Education among youngsters of Indian origin

Statistics Norway has reliable data about educational behavior among young Norwegian residents of Indian origin, who make their educational choices within Norway. The data has been thoroughly analyzed by social scientists (e.g. Lervik 2014a; Schou 2006; Birkeland *et al.* 2014). Among *young* Norwegian residents of Indian origin (ages 19-24 years), the data further distinguishes between two sub-groups: On the one hand, there are young migrants from India. On the other, there are those young men and women who were born in Norway to parents who had migrated from India. The reference group consists of all the young within the Norwegian population at large (ages 19-24 years). Within the reference group, about 50% is in education. The half of the group that is in education is further

divided into two groups: 25% pursued higher education, whereas 17% were still finishing secondary school (Pettersen 2009: 118).


Figure 12. Immigrants from India, ages 19-24, by educational participation and municipality, by 1 October 2007 (%)



Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 118 (Figure 7.11).

Young *Indian-born men and women living in Norway* do not have particularly high participation in education, when compared to young immigrants from post-socialist or other post-colonial states. Among youngsters in Norway who have emigrated from post-colonial or post-socialist countries (most often with their parents), the portion who pursue education is slightly *over* 30%. Among young immigrants from India, the portion is slightly *less* than 30%. However, within the c. 30%, the *portion* that pursues *higher* education is different for each of these categories. Among young “immigrants” 17% is in higher education, whereas for the young Indian immigrants, the portion is about 20%. In this regard, the education ratio among Indian-born youngsters are much closer to similar rates among other young men and women classified as “immigrant” rather than the “reference group” all Norwegians aged 19-24 (Pettersen 2009: 118).

Figure 13. Norwegian-born children of Indian immigrants, ages 19-24, by educational participation and municipality, by 1 October 2007 (%)



Source: Statistics Norway, in Pettersen 2009: 118 (Figure 7.12).

Young Norwegian-born men and women with Indian parents, however, are very likely to go through higher education. About 60% are in higher education, while ca. 15% are still finishing secondary school. The ratio of higher education among young Norwegian-born men and women with Indian parents is nearly double the ratio among the general 19-24 year-old population in Norway (see above). The ratio among Norwegian-born youngsters with Indian parents is also much higher than the ratio among those 19-24 year old with parents who have migrated from non-Western countries, a group that is only slight more likely to do third-level education, when compared to the population at large (Pettersen 2009: 118). Within the aforementioned immigration research, the high rate of higher education among children of Indian immigrants has been noted. It is interpreted as an indicator of the Indian diaspora being exceptionally well integrated into the host society, particularly when compared to diaspora groups from other non-Western countries. However, it would have been as interesting to compare the Norwegian-born Indian diaspora with the diasporas from other Western countries, or from other BRIC-countries. One may question why the statistics tend to lump together diaspora groups from all non-Western countries (Mokhtarri 2013; Jensen 2013). Additionally, in order to inquire into the issue of socio-economic mobility, it would be interesting to see the

education level of these young Norwegian-Indians as compared to their parents. This might usefully be looked at in further research.

Ethnic division of labor among the young?

Most integration research takes interest in the level of education, a phenomenon that can be measured as a quantity, and that is, thus, it is a straightforward task to apply mathematical analytical techniques. Slightly trickier is the question of analyzing choices regarding different categories of education: for example nursing versus engineering. By analyzing categorical variables, Line Schou (2006, 2013) has observed a significant tendency towards an ethnic streaming within higher education. Young Norwegian residents with Indian ethnicity are more likely to choose *medicine*, *dentistry* or *pharmacy*. 45-48% choose one of these three categories, depending on how long they have lived in the country. At a less fine-grained level, it was observed that students of non-western ethnicity are more likely to pursue technology, mathematics, natural science or health science; while ethnically Norwegian youth are more likely to choose education, the social sciences, arts, or the humanities (*ibidem*, see also Lervik 2012). Some might argue that the educational paths pursued by those of non-western ethnicity will lead to higher social status, and if that is correct, it may lead to positive effects for all non-white people in the country. At the same time, it might not be beneficial for the non-white minority if they are scarcely represented within the disciplines that tend to control the means of knowledge-production for societal questions.

From education to employment among the young

In a socio-economic context, higher education has little utility, if it is not put to use by society, or if it does not pay for the individual. Some quantitative sociologists have researched the transfer from education to employment, comparing the offspring of immigrants from, respectively, India and Pakistan (Birkeland *et al.* 2014). *First*, they found that both groups meet “ethnic barriers” in the labor market. But the authors avoid drawing any conclusion about whether the mechanism may be down to discrimination or other factors, such as a lack of information. *Second*, they found that women with Indian or Pakistani parents had a lower “transfer rate” than women in the general Norwegian population, and this is not because of family commitments. This might indicate a gender/ethnicity barrier, possibly intersectional discrimination. *Third*, the authors conclude that higher education does increase the likelihood of getting a job fast, especially for men with Indian or Pakistani parents. We will return to this issue at the end of part 5.4.

Education level among all immigrants from India

Let us now turn attention away from young Norwegian residents of Indian origin, towards immigrants from India to Norway, of all ages, but excluding the children of immigrants. There are figures regarding the education level among immigrants from India to Norway, compared to the education level among immigrant groups from other countries of origin. These figures do not normally distinguish between education from India and brought as an asset to Norway, versus education post arrival in Norway. (These figures also say nothing about educational choices among the children of immigrants, which were discussed above.) According to official education statistics from 2006 immigrants from non-Western countries tend to have lower education than the general Norwegian population, while immigrants from Western countries tend to have higher education than the general population (Henriksen 2007: 32). In all three categories, women tend have higher education than men. Immigrant groups from sixteen different countries of origin are included in that figure. Of these, the top five for average education level are Russia, the Philippines, India, Poland and Iran. The bottom five are Somalia, Turkey, Pakistan, Morocco and Afghanistan. If these proportions have not changed after the more recent survey, then it is striking that Pakistan ranks in the bottom five, but India stands in the top five. Also, it is relevant that the education level among immigrants from the BRICS-states (India and Russia) is closer to the general pattern among Western immigrants than to similar patterns among immigrants from non-Western countries.

Migrants with education from India

The information is scarce regarding whatever competences immigrants have brought into the country. The education level is not been registered when new immigrants arrive. In an attempt to fill in the missing knowledge, Statistics Norway made, in 2012, a systematic survey of the issue (Steinkellner 2012a). Surveys give less reliable data than registries based on bureaucratic routines, but the research led to some interesting findings. First, a wide variation in education levels among immigrants is observed. When comparing immigrants from different countries of origin, some groups have an average education level that is significantly lower than the level for the general Norwegian population. However, some other groups have significantly *higher* education than the general Norwegian population, and this is the case for immigrants from India. Such immigrants clearly bring valuable competences to the country. For the very first migrants from India who settled in Norway, it is possible to use registered education as an indicator of what competences they brought from their area of origin, since they would not have had the time to pursue education within their country of arrival. Analyses of historical statistics indicates that the pioneer immigrant from India to Norway had, in fact, a fairly high education, and rather high social standing within their environment of origin (Wist: 50-57). See Appendix 1 for further details. It is striking that there has been no policy for registering such competences among newcomers to the country. This might be a result of a policy agenda centered on immigrant integration, rather than on immigrants as a resource. Such policies may be symptomatic of popular prejudice, assuming that immigrants are weak and needy, rather than competent, and a potential strength for the host community.

From education to employment in the Indian diaspora

It was observed above that there was a considerable time lag from education to employment among the offspring of immigrants from India and Pakistan, and especially for women (Birkeland *et al.* 2014). Researchers remained agnostic about the explanatory mechanism, but nevertheless interpreted this as an “ethnic barrier”, which affects women more than men. This confirms what was observed in part 5.2 about the labor force participation among immigrants, see particularly our comments on migrant women. Similarly, Appendix 1 shows that among the first generation of immigrants from India to Norway, many brought relatively high levels of education from India, but in Norway they nevertheless ended up with jobs for which they were over-qualified. This problematic has also been discussed in the context of social wellbeing and mental health (Sharma 2009: 17). For diaspora communities it may be especially relevant to ask when or even whether it is possible to find a job that matches the migrant’s education, especially when compared to the general host population. Some recent data indicates that many immigrants in Norway – including some Indian immigrants – are overqualified and underpaid in their present jobs (Bjørnstad and Barstad 2014). This indicates relative deprivation when looked at *in the context of the Norwegian host community* in the host country. Nevertheless, matters are less straightforward *in the context of the Indian diaspora community*, because it might be possible to maintain social standing in the local community of origin by sending foreign currency “back home” (Kramer 1979a: 150).

5.5 Education among study migrants


The internationalization of higher education is a political goal in India, as well as in Norway. A report from the Norwegian Centre for the Internationalization of Education (SIU), citing the UK India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI), argues that India, as a re-emerging economy, seems to be becoming a leading country in terms of research and education (SIU 2012: 30-33, citing UKIERI 2012). The education systems in India and Norway have both been adapted to the English language and the Anglophone system of university degrees. Though this may be judged, for India, a colonial legacy, it may nevertheless facilitate mutual development.

India has experienced a great deal of student emigration, especially to the USA, Great Britain and Australia. In spite of the “brain drain” effect, student migration is now seen as being largely beneficial

for the country of origin, as well as for the destination country (*ibidem*). First, the Indian diaspora is seen as the most successful group of recent immigrants to the USA, and is represented in some of the cutting edge companies in Silicon Valley. Second, a recent survey indicates that the stream of student migration might be turning, with many members of the Indian diaspora in the USA preferring to pursue higher education in India. (See UKIERI 2012, cited in SIU 2012: 30-31.)

Table 6. Students in Norway with Indian citizenship, by university, 2013, absolute numbers


Figur 2. Indiske studenter i Norge i 2013, rangert etter institusjon



Institusjon	2013
Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet	35
Universitetet i Oslo	27
Handelshøgskolen BI	25
Universitetet i Bergen	21
Høgskolen i Gjøvik	20
Universitetet i Stavanger	19
Høgskolen i Oslo og Akershus	14
Norges handelshøgskole	12
Andre (20 institusjoner)	65
Sum	235

Source: SIU 2015.

Figure 14. Students in Norway with citizenship in BRICS countries, absolute numbers




Source: SIU 2015.

Norway has a well-funded public education system, and even though its doctorate has been adapted to the PhD model, doctoral candidates are nevertheless still defined as public employees with a fixed salary. With the internationalization of the science sector, these jobs have become accessible for foreign citizens (though they will have to deal with specific immigration policies, see Chapter 6). In 2013, students in Norway with Indian citizenship stood at just 235 individuals, and spread around 28 different universities. The largest cluster of students with Indian citizenship was found in Trondheim, at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, with 35 individuals (SIU 2015). Among Norwegian-employed PhD Candidates, researchers with Indian citizenship constitute the *sixth* largest group (*ibidem*). As the figure shows, the period 2008-2013 saw a steady increase in Norwegian

students with citizenship in one of the BRICS countries, but the number of students with Russian or Chinese citizenship has remained higher, and has grown bigger, when compared to the number of students from India, Brazil and South-Africa. The relatively small number of Norwegian students with Indian citizenship may be explained by the fact that most student emigrants from India choose other countries. However, one might think that the Norwegian PhD programs would attract more Indian researchers, since the science sector is well funded in Norway, and was adapted to English and the Anglophone grade system.

Figure 15. Students in India with Norwegian citizenship, absolute numbers



Source: SIU 2015.

There also is some student emigration from Norway to India, mainly students taking special courses for half a year. Most of these students study social science, economy and administration, or health science. The total number was between 130 and 160 individuals for 2005-2013, with the exception of 2011-12, when the number was above 180. The numbers do not tell whether or not these students belong to the Indian diaspora in Norway.

It seems like there is clearly potential to further develop the bilateral co-operation between India and Norway in the science sector, including student exchange. Most of the potential probably is for engineering and natural sciences, which are directly applicable for industrial innovation. However, in order to unleash the full economic potential of the Indian diaspora, further bilateral collaboration within the fields of economy and administration, health science, and social science may also be useful.

5.6 Marriage patterns: arranged marriage and family reunification

As observed in Chapter 4, Norwegian residents of Indian origin seem to practice family forms that are rather similar to those of the Norwegian majority population: the nuclear family with few children as the main model, one-head households among students or persons who travel for work, and fewer cases of large-households (see part 4.5 above). This might indicate an adaptation to state welfare or market individualism, where the extended family loses relevance as a welfare institution. Nevertheless, life course interviews with some aging Indian-Norwegians indicate that at least some of these express fear that their children might not provide care for them, confusion about the Norwegian welfare state, and nostalgia for an India that no longer exists (Sharma 2009). These are concrete experiences, though we have no data about the prevalence of such life situations among Norwegian residents of Indian origin. The socio-cultural aspects of this problematic will be addressed in Chapter 7, part 7.2. Some socio-economic aspects of “familism” in the Indian diaspora will be discussed here.

Family migration has been much-used among Indian labor immigrants and their children, as noted in part 5.1 above. A typical pattern of labor migration has been that a family chooses one male member for emigration, who could not take over the farm, or had problems finding a job that matched his education (Wist 2000). After working hard for some years in his new host country, he can afford to bring over his wife and children. The extended family has also been of relevance for chain migration, whereby one pioneer labor migrant chooses to settle in a particular place, then assists other labor migrants from his original local community to migrate to his new local community (*ibidem*). The possibility for migration on the basis of family unification has also been used by labor migrants who were not previously married in their migration from India to Norway, and also among their children born in Norway, or even among their grandchildren. Many Norwegian-born individuals of Indian origin have chosen to return to the village in India where their parents or grandparents grew up, in order to search for a potential spouse. Thus, it has been possible for young people to find each other within a transnational diaspora community. This kind of targeted search for potential spouses allow for the maintenance of social ties – or socio-economic integration – within the Indian diaspora. It also allows for more young persons from India to pursue new opportunities abroad. Thus, the possibility for migration through family unification has had the socio-economic function of maintaining an organizational infrastructure for the diaspora community: it has thus facilitated socio-economic integration across nations.

Arranged marriages in the south-eastern diasporas, is a much-debated issue, especially in contrast to a perceived Scandinavian ideal of “love marriages” (see e.g. Bredal 2006). The most debated issue is to what degree an arranged marriage can be seen as being *voluntary*. This phenomenon, however, is extremely hard to measure. One may certainly observe cases of love marriages or clearly forced marriages, but between those extremes, there might be a continuous scale of more or less voluntary marriages for the sake of economic convenience. Thus, the option may be a question of market position – or socio-economic class – quite as much as a question of cultural practices. Norwegian law accepts that marriage is an economic union, and thus, the ideal of pure love marriage might at times be more ideological than real. Thus, while some cases of forced marriages are easy to identify, there will be other cases that are open for discussion. If there is a socio-economic gap between the two partners, then the structural conditions may have determined the weaker partner to consider the marriage as an attractive option, and then the problem is one of structural conditions, not of individual choice.

Table 7. Norwegian-born children of immigrants who got married 2003-2013, by partner's background

	Number unmarried in 2008	Total number	% partner from majority	% partner same diaspora	% partner other diaspora	% partner foreign resident	% missing data
India							
<i>Women</i>	311	94	17.0	37.2	18.1	19.1	8.5
<i>Men</i>	379	81	9.9	43.2	4.9	24.7	17.3
Pakistan							
<i>Women</i>	1413	677	2.5	47.7	3.0	25.8	21.0
<i>Men</i>	1738	603	3.8	45.3	8.1	24.4	18.4
Turkey							
<i>Women</i>	294	206	1.9	35.4	7.3	29.1	26.2
<i>Men</i>	423	163	4.9	39.3	6.1	20.9	28.8
Morocco							
<i>Women</i>	221	117	9.4	44.4	12.0	6.8	27.4
<i>Men</i>	318	76	5.3	51.3	15.8	7.9	19.7
Denmark							
<i>Women</i>	185	36	80.6	0.0	13.9	5.6	0.0
<i>Men</i>	235	51	74.5	0.0	21.6	2.0	2.0
Sweden							
<i>Women</i>	5362	2132	60.3	12.4	12.5	13.4	1.5
<i>Men</i>	5997	2421	53.0	10.7	14.3	19.4	2.6
Poland							
<i>Women</i>	2185	2884	15.5	68.4	6.1	7.3	2.7
<i>Men</i>	6055	2646	3.6	47.6	2.8	34.5	11.5
USA							
<i>Women</i>	452	790	71.1	3.0	15.4	8.9	1.5
<i>Men</i>	524	915	62.2	1.7	22.4	11.1	2.5

Source: Statistics Norway, in Sandnes and Østby 2015: 32, 50-51.

Marriage patterns among the children of immigrants are of special interest for Statistics Norway. They are taken as an indicator of “how tight contact there is” between different segments of society, in particular between this or that immigrant community, the native majority of the host nation, as well as between various immigrant groups (Wiik 2014: 3). In other words, they are interested in various forms of migrant social integration in the shared national community, in a given diaspora community, and in other diaspora communities. Statistics Norway has been particularly interested in whether the *children of immigrants* choose to marry *partners* with an immigrant background from: the same country of origin (endogamous); or rather from the native majority; or another immigrant group (exogamous) (Wiik 2014; Sandnes and Østby 2015). Such measures give some pointers regarding socio-economic integration with the host nation, and within particular diaspora communities, and across different diaspora communities. The table shows some marriage patterns among the Norwegian-born children of Indian immigrants, compared to Norwegians with immigrant parents from selected countries. (For a larger table with more countries of origin, see Sandnes and Østby 2015: 50-51). Norwegians with parents from India are more likely to marry someone else of an Indian background rather than someone from the Norwegian majority population. They are also more likely to marry someone with another immigrant background, rather than someone from the native majority. However, there are significant gender differences in the marriage pattern among Norwegian-born children of Indian immigrants. Men are much more likely to marry within the Indian diaspora (endogamously), while women are much more likely to marry someone from the native majority or someone from another immigrant diaspora. In this regard, men with parents from

India show a marriage pattern that resembles that of both men and women who have parents from Pakistan or Turkey. It may be puzzling that women with parents from India are more likely to marry exogamously. A similar difference between men and women is found within the Polish diaspora, which has grown in Norway as a result of labor migration within the EU/EEA. For both these groups, women show a marriage pattern which resembles the pattern found among both women and men with parents who have immigrated from other Western countries: multivariate analysis reveals that Norwegian-born persons with parents from *Western* countries are *less likely* to marry *within diaspora* communities, as defined by the country of origin of the parents (Wiik 2014: 4-5).

By contrast, Norwegian-born persons with parents from Asian or African countries are the most likely to marry within diaspora communities from the same country of origin (*ibidem*). This marriage pattern is correlated to marital age and educational level. Higher marital age is negatively correlated to endogamous marriage, while lower or unregistered education levels are positively correlated with endogamous marriage (*ibidem*). It might have been interesting to inquire whether the gender difference in marriage patterns among children of Indian immigrants will remain, if we compare women and men with similar marriage ages or education levels.

What we can conclude so far is the following:

First, Norwegian-born persons with parents from India are more likely to marry within the Indian diaspora (endogamously) than outside it, as with diasporas from other post-colonial or post-socialist countries, but unlike diasporas from Western countries.

Secondly, if compared to Norwegian-born persons with immigrant parents from other countries in the same region, they offspring of Indians are more likely to marry outside of their own diaspora community (exogamously).

Third, Norwegian-born persons with parents from India are likely to find spouses who are residents outside Norway (which may imply family migration for that spouse). This is typical of persons with parents from post-colonial countries, but untypical of persons with parents from post-socialist or Western countries.

Fourth, when comparing women and men among Norwegian-born persons with parents from India, women are considerably more likely to choose spouses from outside their own diaspora community (exogamously), like woman with immigrant parents from Poland, as well as women and men with immigrant parents from Western countries.

Finally, if comparing women and men among Norwegian persons with immigrant parents from any country, including India, the men are more likely to find spouses who are residents outside of Norway (which may mean family migration for the female spouse).

How can we possibly interpret these observations? My suggestion would be to further inquire into the particular socio-economic conditions of the individuals and families who make these choices. Such research questions might suggest a possible direction for future research regarding the Indian diaspora community in Norway, in comparison to other diaspora communities in the country. Further research on marriage practices within the diaspora might lead to further knowledge about how transnational socio-economic integration works through diaspora communities.

5.7 Gender and migration: intersectionality among Norwegian residents of Indian origin

The intersection between gender and ethnicity is complex. It is a hot topic in debates about gender equality within immigrant diasporas. This complexity was perceived in a certain way according to the colonial ideological apparatus, which – according to Gayatri Spivak’s self-conscious hyperbole – said: “White men are saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak 1988: 296-297). *Racial discrimination* can be real, even though “races” are not real.⁵ I will now discuss the possibility of socio-economic discrimination along intersectional lines: the racism/sexism nexus. First, I will review the available data regarding gender-specific reasons for migration among Norwegian residents with Indian origin. Thereafter, I will discuss testimonies about discrimination and gender from Norwegian residents of Indian origin.

Gender-specific data about the reason for migration has not been available. However, there are data that indicate a male majority among labor migrants and a female majority among family migrants. In the demographics of Chapter 4, it was observed that there are slightly more men than women among Norwegian residents of Indian origin, and this is due to a clear male overweight particularly clear in municipalities with many newly arrived Indian immigrants (part 4.3). This indicates a male majority among the newly arrived labor migrants from India. There was also a difference between various age groups, where the elder cohorts had a male majority, but not the younger cohorts of immigrants and their offspring. This indicates that the number of men and woman has become more even over time, possibly because of family migration. This also fits with anthropological and historical descriptions of the first wave of migrants. They were hard-working men, who arrived alone, who wished to earn money in order to finance a nuclear family at their place of residence, and, also, to send remittances to the extended family in their area of origin (Kramer 1979a; Wist 2000). These observations support my interpretation of data about family formation in the previous paragraph (5.7). There, I observed that among persons born in Norway by immigrants from India, significantly more men found a spouse resident outside Norway. The same pattern I found among diaspora communities from every country of origin, and I concluded that this indicated a gendered pattern for migration under the rules for family unification. If these interpretations are correct, one might speculate about possible explanations. Maybe there is something about the legal framework in the country of arrival; maybe there is something about gendered division of labor in all countries of origin; maybe there is a combination?

Gender issues within the diaspora

There is much debate about gender issues in family-based and religiously based social organization within the Indian diaspora, as well as other diaspora communities. Several researchers have discussed gendered social organization within traditional family forms in the Indian diaspora. Brenna (2012) has claimed that it was hard to gain acceptance when she divorced; while Sharma (2009) has observed that some aging women show fear about their future social standing if they become widows. In the debate around arranged marriages, the discussion about levels of voluntary choice is relevant for young persons of both genders (Bredal 2006). If a marriage involves a low degree of consent from the aspiring husband and/or wife, it implies gender-related discrimination against the young man and/or the young woman. These qualitative studies indicate that at least some women experience gendered vulnerability as a result of some of the family practices within the Indian diaspora in Norway. The quantitative prevalence of such trouble is difficult to uncover, but for individuals who experience it, such problems may prove to be a problem. It is also difficult to tell whether this is because of traditions brought from India, or because of practices that might have gained new dysfunctions as a

⁵ Though “races” are not real, *racial discrimination* may nevertheless be real. Racist practices refer to some body features that become significant for that practice. How can we describe which are these features without using the terminology of racism (or, in more technical terms, without racialization)? In this report I address the possibility of a racism/sexism nexus by using the terms “non-white women” and “women of color”. The terms are awkward, but the alternatives may be even worse. (See also Chapters 2.3 and 5.2.)

result of adaptation to the host country. In the latter case there are two possible mechanisms, both a reaction to the official ideology of equality in the Norwegian state, and/or a blending with similar cultural reactions within some segments of ethnically Norwegian civil society. (For a comparison of homegrown and imported forms of patriarchy in Scandinavia, see Strindberg 2002.) There also are discussions about gender discrimination within religious associations. For example, Sikh organizations in Norway tend to state that they practice gender equality. Nevertheless, there are feminist members who push for improvements. The young labor party politician Kaur (2012), who is also active in the Sikh temple in Oslo, has made a political point by wearing the traditional turban for young male Sikhs.

Women of South-Asian origin at the Norwegian labor market

There are some indications of possible discrimination against non-white women in the Norwegian labor market. As mentioned above (5.4), quantitative research on the transfer from education to employment among the children of immigrants from India and Pakistan indicates that both groups tend to meet “ethnic barriers”, while the transfer to employment tends to be even slower for non-white women than for non-white men (Birkeland *et al.* 2014). The authors refrain from drawing any conclusions as to why, but suggest language problems or discrimination. In this report, I had a similar discussion regarding the diverging rates of employment between men and women, comparing immigrants from non-Western countries and everyone else in the population, and finally, the nexus between both the gender gap and the ethnicity gap (part 5.2 above). The only one of the social scientists who explicitly addresses racial discrimination against Norwegian residents of Indian origin is Mehdu Sharma (2009), herself the only one among the authors who is a non-white woman, as well as a social scientist. In this context, it is relevant to note that Frode Helland (2014), a white male, has suggested that we should distinguish between racism as an explicit ideology and racism as an implicit mentality. Good intentions are not sufficient to achieve good practice, because the decolonization of knowledge is a laborious process, implying inquiry into many under-researched issues (Chakrabarty 2000). Such reflections are relevant for putting the present report into context, because its writer is a white male, striving to learn how we can live in an anti-racist and anti-sexist way. Perhaps we should distinguish between discrimination experienced by the “receiver”, and discrimination as experienced by the “sender” of discriminatory practices. That way, it might be easier to talk about the racism/sexism nexus within a national environment, where egalitarianism has become an official ethos.

5.8 Caste and migration: higher status in the community of origin

There is no systematic registry data regarding the caste background of Norwegian residents of Indian background. Regarding the first wave of migration from India to Norway, some are content to observe that most got labor class work in industry or agriculture (e.g. Pettersen 2009: 110). Less interest has been taken in their social standing prior to emigrating from India. For issues where no data registries exist, other methods must be used. Caste background has become an issue within some recent research which combines qualitative and quantitative methods (Wist 2000, Lervik 2010, 2012, 2014). Some hypotheses regarding caste background patterns have been suggested on the basis of qualitative interviews, combined with discussion of relevant studies of general Indian diasporas.

Wist (2000: 29-31) observes that many first wavers from India to Norway had got a good education prior to emigration from India, even though they got labor class jobs in Norway. Thus, she argues, most of these migrants must have had a “middle class” background, which implies that they were unlikely to come from lower castes (including the Dalit, or “casteless” castes). This is backed by Sharma (2009: 17), who argues that it is a popular prejudice that the early labor immigrants from India to Norway lacked higher education.

Lervik (2014a: 40) argues that caste background, together with the urban-rural distinction, are some of the relevant mechanisms of social differentiation within the Indian and Pakistani diaspora communities. On the basis of her qualitative interviews, she observes that caste background seems to

be relevant for the Indian diaspora, because they relate to status hierarchies not only within the host country, but also within their environment of origin (Lervik 2012; 2014: 41). She suggests that caste might be best seen as a form of capital, alongside economic capital, social capital and cultural capital. She offers two possible mechanisms regarding the effect of caste background upon socio-economic integration in the host country. One possibility is that from the fact of coming from a higher caste in India (or Pakistan) might make young Norwegian residents of Indian (or Pakistani) origin aim higher, and be more ambitious. Another possibility, however, is that this kind of higher-caste background from India (or Pakistan) might make the migrants and their offspring more “laid back”, not investing the necessary labor and resources in order to succeed in the host country. The existing data do not provide any ground to conclude which these possible mechanisms is operating (Lervik 2014: 42). However, Wist (2000: Chapter 3) has found register data and ethnographies which suggest that the Indian diaspora in Norway might have experienced a fall in social status during the 1970s and 1980s, then a rise of status in the 1990s.

5.9 Remittances and social ties to India

There are, unfortunately, no measurement of remittances transferred from Norway to India. There are no data about the volume of these remittances, nor any systematic information about their destination within India. This could be seen in the context of the more general challenge observed by Statistics Norway, which is the lack of institutions to gather systematic data that are relevant for understanding the impact of globalization on the economy (Stensrud 2009). If global corporations are globalization at elite level, then the diaspora economies might be best seen as middle-class globalization.

There is some information about some of the socio-economic ties between Norwegian residents of Indian origin and their communities of origin in India. Some relevant information was reviewed above, in the discussions about transnational marriages (5.6), gender differences (5.7) and caste differences (5.8). Taken together, these three paragraphs sketch a map of the socio-economic structure within the Indian diaspora in Norway. Historical research on the basis of register data, ethnographies and some in-depth interviews suggest that the most decisive mechanisms for migration are found not found in individual choices, or in structural determinants. Rather they are found in processes within social networks – the meso level (Wist 2000: 38). The decision about emigration was taken together with the extended family, and the extended family funded migration, while the *émigré* sent remittances back to the extended family. Social networks also played a decisive role when labor emigrants from India and Pakistan found work in Norway. Family ties – as well as religious associations – played a key function whereby an employee of Indian or Pakistani origin could provide brokerage between a local employer and a potential new employee (*ibidem*: 44-45). Thus, the *émigré* might not be integrated in the ethnically native social network. But he or she might partly compensate for this lack of social capital by drawing on family ties and religious associations within the diaspora community. The practical usage of diaspora networks for emigration and immigration can explain chain migration. That may be the most relevant mechanism to explain why labor migrants from one particular region of origin (e.g. Indian and Pakistani Punjab) tend to settle in one particular host region (e.g. the Drammen urban region).

From a socio-economic viewpoint, diaspora networks may include religious associations, political parties, business partnerships, interest organizations, and circles of personal friends, but the most significant of all the networked economic units is the extended family. Labor migration might be best seen as one of many livelihood adaptations whereby extended families maintain or empower their collective socio-economic standing within a globalized economy. Thus, labor migration stands as a particular form of globalization “from below”, which might potentially compliment corporation-led and state-led globalization “from above”. Therefore, diaspora economies are one of the relevant issues of inquiry when Statistics Norway (Stensrud 2009) suggest that registries be adapted to account for the globalization of the economy.

6. Legal framework

Norway does not have any specific policy framework in relation to migrants from India. Broadly speaking, at present, Norwegian migration policy separate between three wide areas of origin:

1. The Nordic countries,
2. The EU/EEA area,
3. Countries outside the EU/EEA area

The regulations get less liberal as we go down this list. That means, citizens from other Nordic countries face the fewest obstacles migrating to Norway, while citizens that are from outside the EU/EEA area face the greatest number. Migration from India is governed by the rules pertaining to the third category. In the text below, we will focus on the rules and policies regarding this category.

Norwegian migration policies distinguish between different types of migration, which means that there are different ways to get work and residence permits. Refugees and asylum seekers, work migration, family reunification, and international students are examples of migration types that are governed by different policies. Refugees and asylum seekers account for a substantial proportion of non-EU migration to Norway, however, the number of Indians in this group is negligible. Therefore, in this review I will disregard that field, and focus on the other types of migration. We will also look away from any programs aimed at promoting circular migration, since such policies fall outside the legal framework as strictly defined.

Below, we will offer a brief historical survey of the development of the regulations relating to different types of migration, followed by a presentation of the framework as it is today. (Part 6.2.2. is adapted from an earlier Carim-India report, Brenne and Jensen 2013, written by ourselves).

6.1 Regulation of work migration

6.1.1 Historical development: from open borders to complex regulations

Norway is a relatively new net recipient of foreign work migrants. Up until the 1950s, Norway was largely a net exporter of work migrants. But the rebuilding of the country after the Second World War, caused an economic boom, creating a greater demand of workers. From the 1960s onwards, “guest workers” (*fremmedarbeidere*) entered the labour market in large numbers. These came from different parts of the world, and became a useful resource for the newly established and fast growing oil industry, parts of industry more generally, and the service sector. The lack of previous experience as a recipient country of work migration, also meant that the state did not at the time have any developed legal framework to deal with it. This lack of regulations meant that early legal practice had a very liberal character, with very low requirements for granting work and residence permits. This lead to some problems, as some of the early work migrants were faced with bad housing conditions, as well as poor salaries.

In 1975 Norway saw a very important change in the migration policy. A temporary “immigration stop” was passed in 1975 (Norwegian Official Reports 2011: 68). There were several reasons behind this change. A need was seen to improve the living conditions of the workers already there, many of whom were living in bad conditions (*ibidem*; see also Norwegian Official Report 1973; Norwegian Ministry of Municipalities 1974; and Kjeldstadli 2003c: Chapter 4). However, by the mid-1970s, the Norway economy and that of other European countries was suffering a downturn, meaning less work. Other countries – including Sweden, Denmark and West-Germany – had tightened their migration laws in the years before, and the Norwegian government chose to do the same thing.

It is also important to note, that despite its name, the “immigration stop” of 1975 was not a full stop on migrants. Rather, it was a framework of rules and regulations that calibrated work-migration with national needs. Highly qualified workers were still needed for various sectors, in particular the oil-industry. Applications, however, were cumbersome. Foreign workers had to apply to work from abroad, and their type of work had to fit into specified categories. It was not until the late 1990s that rules became less restrictive and foreign nationals were able to enter, find work, and then apply for the necessary permits.

A further significant historical change was the EEA treaty (European Economic Area) of 1994, and the opening of the common EU labour market, in 2004. The EEA treaty made it simpler for EU and EEA nationals to find work in Norway, and in 2004 the labour market was opened completely to citizens of other EEA/EU countries. The details of the regulations regarding EU/EEA migration are not under examination here. However, it must be noted that Norway’s full integration into the EU/EEA area may have made it more difficult for qualified migrants from non-EU/EEA countries to find work, as the number of available workers are much greater now than before, and competition is therefore higher.

6.1.2 Present day policies regarding non-EU/EEA work migrants⁶

From countries outside of the EEA/EU, only “skilled workers or specialists” are granted a work and residence permit, given that they are offered work matching their skills. The policies deal with three types of “highly-skilled migration”:

- a) Completed vocational training at upper secondary school level, for at least three years, e.g. as a carpenter or health worker. There must be a corresponding vocational training programme in Norway.
- b) Completed education or degree from a university/university college, e.g. a Bachelor’s degree as an engineer or a nurse.
- c) Special qualifications obtained through long work experience, if relevant in combination with courses.

“Ethnic cooks” are a distinct category, subject to strict requirements for receiving a work and residence permit. Permits are only granted in exceptional cases. However, if one is to work as a cook and does not prepare “ethnic” food, one may apply for a residence permit within the framework of being a skilled worker (Brenne and Jensen, 2014; see also UDI 2015).

There is also a minimum salary requirement for skilled workers. In general, the prospective worker is not offered pay that is lower than the average paid to Norwegian workers with the same occupation in that industry. If the work requires a master degree, the workers cannot be paid less than scale 47 on the pay scale for state employees. In 2015, this equals 409,700 NOK, or approximately 45,000 EUR.

There is presently a yearly max quota of 5,000 skilled work migrants from non-EU/EEA countries. However, the annual number of work migrants have been well within this quota.

In order to get a permanent residence permit, one must have had a permit to stay in Norway continuously for three years. “Continuously”, means that one should not have gaps of more than three months between different permits. Also, one cannot have stayed outside of Norway for more than fifteen months, or seven months, if one’s permit is as a “specialist” or “skilled worker”.

Norway has mandatory introductory programmes, which provides newly arrived immigrants with training in Norwegian and knowledge of Norwegian society⁷. Job seekers from outside the EU/EEA

⁶ Largely adapted from Brenne and Jensen 2013.

⁷ Asylum seekers and refugees, and their family members, have a much more extensive programme, and it is free.

area, are required to take 300 lessons, 250 lessons in Norwegian and 50 lessons in knowledge of Norwegian society. The costs must be covered by the subject themselves (Norwegian official Reports 2011: 94).

Health professionals need an authorization or license from the Norwegian Registration Authority for Health Personnel (SAK). The processing time to get this varies. If applicants are from a Nordic countries, the processing time is about six weeks. If they have education from the EU and EEA area, it is three to four months. With education from outside the EU/EEA area, the procedure is more complex and depends on the type of health work. For most health care professions (psychologists, nurses, and health care workers) it is six months. Medical doctors have a two-step procedure. They first need to have their educational credentials certified, before they can have their case processed by SAK. The verification process itself takes four to six months, then SAK needs six months more to process the case. For dental practitioners the processing by SAK may be even longer. Medical doctors also need to take a technical language course, as well as a course in ordinary written and spoken Norwegian. This course is regularly organised at the University of Oslo. Other health professions are exempted from any formal language demands, however the employer may require language training (Brenne and Jensen, 2014: 5).

Migrant workers may apply for their family members to be granted a residence permit in Norway (see below). If this is granted, their family members are entitled to work. Norway has a high degree of labour market participation from women, and this is encouraged by government policies. Parents have shared rights to total parental leave of one year, while at the same time getting 80% salary compensation (see Appendix 2). There are subsidised kindergartens, to make it easier for parents to combine work with family life.

Norway is obliged through the GATS-treaty and WTO membership to give all members of WTO access to Norway. The authorities are obliged to grant work permits to workers from international companies for countries that are WTO-members, without examining how their specialisation fit with the Norwegian labour market.

6.2 Regulation of spouse and family migration

6.2.1 Historical development: from extended family to “next of kin”

Rules regarding family migration have been changed gradually, becoming stricter and stricter.

Before the “migration stop” in 1975, there was no formal rule regarding minimum income requirement for the sponsor of spouse and close kin migration. However, this had been a part of a “long established practice” (Norwegian Official Reports 1973: 81). The rule was formalised in 1975, initially with a requirement for a place of living. This requirement was dropped in 1991, as the possibility for checking this requirement was seen as difficult. There was, early on, a wish that family members should not become a source of expenditure for the state. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s there was also a wish for family migration to be made easier, not least to assist with integration (Norwegian Official Reports 2011: 73). However, through the 1990s and 2000s rules gradually became stricter, with additional requirements for minimum income (see table 1 below). Still, between 1995 and 1998, and from 2000 until 2006, family migration was the principal reason for migration to Norway. A survey of the historical development of rules regarding family migration of spouse and next of kin, are set out below in Table 8.

Table 8. Historical development of rules and regulation regarding migration of family and close kin

Year	Change	Background
1975	Rule of minimum income and place of living for migration of the family of a foreigner residing in Norway	Introduced in relation to the “immigration stop” in 1975
1991	Requirement of a place of living for close kin removed. Continuation of minimum income rule, with several exceptions (Norwegian citizen, refugee, person with permanent residence permit, and more).	Difficulties of controlling the initial rule. Continuation of general principles.
1997	Possibility of family reunification and exceptions to the rule of minimum income, for persons with collective protection as well as humanitarian refugees.	Need for protection of the whole family. Also, easier to facilitate integration with the whole family present.
2000	Iraqi asylum seekers given unique temporary residence permit without the possibility of family reunification or migration of spouse.	Reduce number of asylum seekers.
2003	Reintroduction of minimum income requirement for persons with residence on humanitarian grounds.	Reduction of number of asylum seekers, as well as avoiding having more liberal rules than other countries
2003	Minimum income requirement also introduced for Norwegian citizens under the age of 23.	Reduction in the number of forced marriages
2008	Minimum income requirement made stricter, income requirement for previous year increased.	Reduction in the number of asylum seekers.
2010	Rules regarding minimum income made stricter. For example, minimum income is required for an extended period of time.	Reduction in the number of asylum seekers and forced marriages.

Source: based on Norwegian Official Reports 2011: 74.

6.2.2 Present day policies regarding family migration

At present (in 2015), the requirement is that the sponsor must have had an income of 251,856 NOK⁸ before tax in 2014 in order to be eligible to apply to be reunited with a family member.

The definition of who counts as “family” in terms of family migration are spouses, unmarried partners, living together for at least two years (or with children), and children under the age of eighteen.

Marriages that are formalised outside of Norway are generally recognized, but the spouses cannot have been under eighteen at the time of marriage and both must have been physically present at the time of the wedding.

It has been possible to apply for other family members as well, such as older parents, siblings, or others that have been under the sponsor’s care. However, there are high requirements for applications in relation to this group and family migration has rarely been granted (Norwegian Official Reports 2011: 73).

The present regulations regarding support and sponsorship date back from new rules (in *Utlendingsforskriften*) introduced on 1 January 2010. This was a major change that tightened the rules significantly. It made the requirement for income stricter for all groups, as well as widening the minimum income requirement to groups previously exempted from it.

⁸ This is approximately 28,000 euros. The “sponsor” is the person living in Norway who wants family reunification. The “applicant” is the family member who wants to move to Norway.

It is now only the income of the sponsor – the person residing in Norway who wants family reunification – that is, if necessary, taken into account. Before this, the expected income of the person wishing to migrate to Norway could also be taken into account. The sponsor needs to document his or her registered income in the previous tax year, as well as future expected income. A new rule stipulates that the sponsor may not have received any social aid from the government the previous year. A new rule requires all Norwegian citizens above age of 23 as well as foreign nationals with a permanent resident permit, to document minimum income when acting as sponsors. These had earlier been exempt from the requirement (Norwegian Official Report 2011: 8; *Lovdata* 2015)

6.2.3 Future regulations for family migration: further restrictions?

Limited opportunities to restrict other types of migration makes family migration a natural target for stricter regulations. The recent changes in family migration rules have been significant, and some reflection regarding their origins is needed here. To understand why rules regarding family migration have become stricter, one needs to see them in the context of recent public controversies regarding migration in general. As in many other European countries, Norway's right-wing parties strive to limit migration from non-western countries (this is particularly true of the Progress Party). These demands enjoy some support among the population. In general, other political parties of the political mainstream, such as Arbeiderpartiet (the Labour Party), and Høyre (the Conservative Party), have also adopted more restrictive views on migration. However, the problem of legislators is that a lot of migration is governed by UN or EU treaties. Norway cannot easily back away from obligations implied in such treaties. This is particularly true for regulations regarding asylum seekers and refugees. However, family migration is still largely under the control of the national government.⁹ The increase in restrictions address public concerns for limiting welfare system expenditure for unskilled family migrants who may not succeed in finding work in Norway. There are also concerns on limiting forced marriages. Changes introduced in family migration, can be flagged up by politicians wishing to be seen as "hard" on migration.

This tendency is likely to continue, as the pressure on the other channels of immigration is heavy, and the popular demand from part of the population to reduce migration will continue.

6.3 Regulations for international students

6.3.1 Historical development: from recipients of aid to potential resources

Norway originally regarded international students as a problem. These were individuals from less wealthy countries that that Norway had an obligation to help with an education, not a potential resource Norwegian economy (Norwegian Official Reports 2011: 75). In 1977, laws were introduced that made it possible for international students from developing countries to get loans and stipends for studying in Norway, in much the same way as Norwegian students. In 1994, this became a quota-scheme, which set a maximum on the number of students from developing countries who would be eligible for loan and stipend.

In 1991, laws were introduced that limited the possibility of staying in Norway after studies were finished. All international students were required to leave, once their studies were over. They could only apply for a work permit in Norway after five years of "quarantine" abroad (*Ibid.*). The rationale was that the Norwegian government was, in this way, assisting the development of poorer countries. It was indicative of a mind-set that regarded international students as a problem, rather than a potential resource for the Norwegian economy. In 2001, this changed, and the quarantine-rules were dropped.

⁹ See for example *Dagens Næringsliv* (2015), where the Progress Party – now in government – advocates a further increase in minimum income requirement for family migration.

Foreign specialists were allowed to apply for work after they finished their studies, as long as the work was relevant to their education.

6.3.2 Present day policies: free tuition, but pressure to change

Norway has had and still has a well developed public system of higher education that has largely been free of tuition fees. Private educational institutions, however, require tuition fees. This includes several business schools and schools for the creative professions (such as media, art, and design). International students are allowed to take paid work of up to twenty hours each week, which is similar to a 50% job. In order for non-EU/EEA students to receive a student visa, however, he or she needs to document sufficient means for living costs and subsistence in Norway for one year: an amount stipulated at 10,000 euro. International students are generally helped with a living space (student dormitory or similar) for a cost well below market level.

Unlike most other countries, Norway also exempts foreign nationals and non-EU citizens from tuition in public education. There is, however, an ongoing debate on whether a tuition fee should be introduced for non-EU/EEA citizens. The current right-wing government proposed, as part of the national budget in October 2014, a tuition fee for non-EU/EEA students. The proponents for this change argued that it was not in the interest of Norway to provide free education for students from China or the USA, since they have well-developed education systems of their own. Also, several countries had recently introduced a similar tuition fees for non-EU/EEA students, most notably Germany and Sweden. This could lead one to believe that more students would apply to Norway solely because of the lack of tuition, something that might increase the number of applicants and the pressure on the system significantly. Opponents of change argued that the introduction of a tuition fee would reduce the number of non-EU/EEA students to next to none, since high living costs would make Norway unattractive as a destination. Some also referred to the older idea of helping poor countries – namely, that Norway as a rich country should assist less wealthy countries to educate their citizens. The government proposition was eventually withdrawn in November 2014 before the final national budget was passed. It was withdrawn partly due to protests from student organisations, and partly thanks to a political deal with other parties. However, the issue is not permanently settled, and it is likely that the current government will try to change the rules again in the future.¹⁰

7. Socio-cultural integration

The “integration” of immigrants, is much debated in Norway. As in other West-European countries, the debate refers to migrants from non-Western regions. However, the term “integration” has different meanings. In the literature review above, it was observed that most social science research shows a “social democratic” commitment to *socio-economic* integration. The issue was discussed in detail, above, in Chapter 4 of this report. Only one of the contributions reviewed (Staurland 2012) expressed a more “national romantic” worry over whether newly arrived migrants from India are interested in adapting to Norwegian culture. Such a worry about *socio-cultural* integration may resonate with an important public debate on culture and liberty. Groups like the Progress Party and the Human Rights Service (an NGO not to be confused with Human Rights Watch) claim that liberty is a nationally or civilizationaly specific value, and consequently, that immigrants from foreign nations or civilizations must choose between our liberty and their culture. Social scientists can hardly lend their voices to this view, not because of any bias, but rather because the ideology is empirically wrong. Historical research has demonstrated that Norway and the West were never culturally homogeneous (Sørensen 1998), and even that there has been internal colonialism (Pedersen 1999). But the heterodox social

¹⁰ The issue was widely covered in the Norwegian press. See e.g. *Dagens Næringsliv* (2014), *Fremover* (2014), and *Universitas* (2014).

scientist Sigurd Skirbekk (2008) nevertheless points out that the nation-state was historically the basis of the Norwegian welfare state. The nation matters precisely because it is a social construction, an artifact, and it cannot be taken for granted. For the same reason, it is in a state of flux, adapting to new circumstances, as all living traditions. As several researchers of nation-building have pointed out, minorities and majorities are concepts that get their meaning in relation to each other. Consequently, research into diaspora minorities may become misleading if it assumes that nation building is a finished process (Eriksen and Hoëm 1999; Bauböck 2008). The various *states* are already *socio-economically integrated into each other* through global trade, pollution, security risks, and inter-governmental organizations. It might, therefore, increase democratic accountability if the various *nations* deepen their *socio-cultural integration with each other* through transnational civil society, including diaspora communities. The present chapter will, on the basis of this theoretical position, present existing knowledge about various aspects of socio-cultural integration among Norwegian residents of Indian origin.

First, the chapter will discuss the *low prevalence of social problems*, as a positive function of social integration (7.1). Thereafter, the chapter will discuss integration into the *Norwegian national community*, (7.2), and forms of integration in the *transnational Indian diaspora* (7.3). The emphasis will be on the making and maintenance of “social capital” in the form of socio-cultural ties. In the end, the chapter will also discuss how the Norwegian mass media portrays persons of Indian origin (7.5). Thus, the chapter will end by discussing the level of cultural integration for the Norwegian national community into larger, more cosmopolitan fellowships.

The chapter combines qualitative and quantitative data sources. The first two parts of the chapter will present register data regarding the low prevalence of social problems among Norwegian residents of Indian origin, as well as the high level of integration into the Norwegian national community. These topics have been defined as being relevant within established state policy, and as a result, systematic data gathering has taken place. The two final parts of the chapter will review qualitative data that indicates how transnational subcultures facilitate socio-cultural integration between nations that are socially and spatially distant. In line with contemporary developments within social anthropology, the chapter sees increased communication, trade, social ties, and understanding about others as indicators of the creation of “social capital” within and across previously established cultural fellowships. If increased transnational integration leads to increased interest in this issue among state policy makers, we might see richer data regarding the topic in the future.

7.1 Low prevalence of social problems – a function of integration

The prevalence of social problems is significantly lower among Indian-Norwegians, compared to Norwegian residents in general. In other words, the minority of Indian origin cause less trouble for the welfare state than the Norwegian majority. This conclusion is based on three indicators.

First, let us take the most hotly debated topic: crime rates among immigrants. Norwegian residents of Indian origin, have an *equal or lower* registered crime level than the average for the general Norwegian population. This differs from immigrants (and their offspring) from *some other* countries, who tend to be slightly over-represented in the crime statistics, even after controlling for correlation with other factors that often correlate with registered crime, such as income level, gender, and age (Skarðhamar, Thorsen and Henriksen 2011). The authors remind us that criminals will tend to avoid being registered, and that the police are more likely to discover criminals among the groups that they perceive as being criminally-inclined, and therefore check people more regularly. Others have raised the question of whether it is conceptually valid to take “immigrants” as one statistical group (Jensen 2007). In any case, it is clear that the Norwegian police have experienced less trouble with members of the Indian minority, when compared to members of the Norwegian majority.

Second, immigrants from India are significantly less likely to receive social security benefit than the Norwegian population in general (Hirsch 2010). Other immigrant categories who are less likely than the

majority to receive such support include those from the Philippines, Romania, Denmark, Poland, Germany and Lithuania (*ibidem*). This might be because most migrants from these countries come for work, whereas political refugees may have more problems, and may therefore be more dependent on help. For example, an orphaned child soldier from Somalia has little in common with a computer engineer from India, though both are “immigrants” (see also Henriksen 2007; Mokhtarri 2007).

Third, child poverty is more prevalent in families that are classified as “immigrant”, than in general Norwegian families. For families from India, however, this is not the case (Epland and Kirkeberg 2014).

In sum, the residents of Indian origin experience fewer social problems than the Norwegian population in general. This certainly indicates an absence of social marginalization and, indeed, social integration. What, however, is the cause? If we take up a Marxist explanatory model, it may be relevant that Norwegian-Indians tend to have high labor force participation, a very high rate of higher education, and can send currency to peers in India, all indicating good socio-economic integration (see Chapter 4). However, if we instead choose a functionalist explanatory model, it may be equally or more relevant that the Norwegian residents of Indian origin tend to be active participants within the national community in the host country, while also enjoying social contacts with the diaspora community. Both these points indicating, of course, good socio-cultural integration (see parts 7.2 and 7.3, respectively).

7.2 Cultural integration into the host nation: state, market and civil society

What is the national culture that immigrants are supposed to integrate into? Cultural practices are always diverse, but it is possible to identify hegemonic practices within any cultural formation. The hegemonic national culture in Norway might be said to emphasize state politics more than informal power, market economy more than informal exchange, and civil society more than the informal familism. (Another, trickier question is to what extent this hegemonic ethos of equality might be hypocritical. For a critical discussion about this issue, see parts 5.2, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 above.)

Integration in the state – elections and parties

Norwegian residents of Indian origin are eager to exercise their right to vote. At the parliamentary election in 2013, there was a considerable decrease in voting participation among Indians in Norway (about seven percentiles). However, this group had had a higher voting participation than the general Norwegian population, and thus, the decrease leaves the group on level with the average for the general population (Wiggen and Aalandslid 2014: 36). In party politics, there are relatively few members of minorities of non-western origin (often non-white), but there has been a political priority for mobilizing more participation from these minorities. The relative success in integrating young non-whites is seen as a provocation by some. A young politician of Indian origin, Prableen Kaur, is the youngest person to be voted into a municipal assembly in the country. She was also the most publically vocal of the survivors after a right-wing extremist massacre of young political activists, 22 July 2011, at a youth summer camp organized by the Labor Party. In fact, she commented on the experience, in a blog entry, 23 June, that was much cited in the mass media (Kaur 2011, 2012). After this incident, Kaur has become an example for young voters from ethnic minorities and particularly for young non-white women. The state and the parties may constitute a more important arena in Norway than in many other countries, because of the rather intrusive state tradition. This in spite of some countryside regions having rather informal politics (Vike 2009), for example the Sámi areas (Jensen 2015).

Integration in the market – employment and income

The level of formal employment among Norwegian residents of Indian origin has been discussed in detail in Chapter 5.2. The relatively high degree of participation in the wage labor market has resulted in relatively high incomes. Among immigrants to Norway from post-socialist or post-colonial countries, immigrants from India have the highest income level. Nevertheless the income level among

immigrants from India is still lower than the average for the Norwegian population. Additionally, immigrants from India are also lagging behind immigrants from Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the three last even enjoying higher incomes than the average Norwegian (Omholt and Strøm 2014). In many countries, the informal economic sector is large, which is never seen in statistics. I do not think this is the case for Norway, though it might be the case in some limited regions or sectors (Lien 1997): for example among Sámi herders and fishers (Jensen 2015), or in the entrepreneurial Sunnmøre district.

Integration in society – language and norms

Mastering the language of the host community may be key to wider social participation. Some residents from non-Western countries experience difficulties with learning Norwegian. This is especially the case if they work as housewives, outside the formalized economy (see e.g. Røed 2006 regarding a Turkish community in Drammen). The Norwegian residents of Indian origin seem to be less likely to find themselves in such a vicious circle of bad language skills and marginalization from the formal sector: though there are no quantitative measurements. The relatively high degree of participation in wage work (see Chapter 5.2) probably implies learning the native language as well. The issue of language and participation may also be framed in terms of language and norms. One teacher at an introductory course for immigrants interviewed Indian labor migrants, who all expressed eagerness to learn the native language in their new host country (Staurland 2012). She chose to define motivation to learn the native language in terms of adaptation to the native mentality and norms. The Norwegian ethos is often framed as one of liberty and individualism, often in contrast to assumed South-Asian values of familial solidarity and patriarchal authority (see Bredal 2006 for a discussion). This perceived contrast may be explained in terms of mentality, as a civic ethos and a clan ethos. Alternatively, the same contrast may be explained more materialistically, in terms of what kind of social organization a person is already dependent on, or has learned to live with. This is the same as “culture” defined as, respectively, *ideas* or as *praxes*. By defining culture as praxes, one avoids (mis)interpreting norms in isolation from their practical context. In her study of mental and social wellbeing among aging residents of Indian origin, Sharma (2009) noted the anxiety that adult children may not be interested to provide care, combined with lack of information about the Norwegian welfare system, and nostalgia for an India that no longer exists. This may indicate some possible risks for members of the Indian diaspora in Norway, but there may equally well exist possibilities for combining individualist state welfare with collectivist family welfare. In fact, hybrid cultural adaptations are traditional in some parts of Norway, for example, in Sunnmøre and the Sami areas mentioned above. There is an actual entanglement of individualism and familism in Norway: so much so that there are even well-known family dynasties within party politics and corporate business in Norway.

The cultural analysis provided in the present section confirms the impression from the quantitative immigration research (see part 2.1): namely that Norwegian residents of Indian origin are particularly well integrated within the host nation, above all, when compared to other diaspora communities settled in Norway. This impression is further amplified by providing a more refined understanding of pluralism within the dominant majority culture of the Norwegian host nation. As suggested by scholars of nationalism and ethnicity, one gains a more realistic understanding of diaspora minorities by avoiding ideological clichés about national majorities (Eriksen and Hoëm 1999, as well as Bauböck 2008, see the introduction to the present chapter).

When one takes a closer look at the Norwegian national culture, with its ambiguities of rural and the urban, the informal and the formal, then the situation of the Indian diaspora appears even more similar to that of ethnic Norwegians. An increased refinement in the interpretation of socio-cultural integration has consequences for framing socio-economic integration as well. See parts 5.2, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 in the present report for a critical discussion of how to frame ethnicity, gender, class, and caste among Norwegian residents of Indian origin.

7.3 Cultural integration in the diaspora: cultural and religious associations

Scarce data exist regarding cultural and religious associations among Norwegian residents of Indian origin. However, it is also socio-culturally relevant to bear in mind the observations regarding socio-economic integration into the diaspora community, at the end of Chapter 5 (see part 5.9).

Diaspora organizations by religion

It is relevant to have a look at studies of diaspora communities that are defined in religious terms. Certain religious diasporas have populations that are partly overlapping with those of particular national diasporas. For example, there is a considerable overlap between the Indian diaspora, and the Hindi and Sikh, Moslem and Catholic diasporas on the other. I have not done any systematic search for research regarding these partly overlapping religious diasporas in Norway, but I have, nevertheless, found some relevant contributions. Oslo Museum had an exhibition about the holy spaces of the various religious minorities in the city, and published a book with visual and textual ethnography about each of the selected religious minorities (Bettum 2014). The book presents a Sikh temple in Oslo that has a mostly Indian congregation, but the Hindu temple chosen for that book was attended mainly by Sri-Lankan Tamils. Sikhs in Norway are relatively visible, not least because of their traditional male way of dress: there is research on the Sikh diaspora in Norway (Jacobsen 2011). The same author has published research on Sri-Lankan Tamil Christian diasporas in Norway (Jacobsen 2008), but these may be of more peripheral relevance to a study of the Indian diaspora. The Catholic Church in Oslo has effective organizational resources for various diaspora communities to maintain ties, something I have observed by participating in the ecumenical Christian Arab diaspora, and through conversations with friends in the Polish diaspora. Ecumenism is also typical for Hindu and Sikh religious organizations, which even visit each other's temples (Sharma 2009). As discussed at the end of Chapter 5, some research suggest that religious associations, in addition to extended family networks, might constitute a significant infrastructure for the social organization of diaspora communities (see part 5.9). These two forms of social organization might suggest that were we to map the inner workings of the diaspora communities, then it may be more relevant to define diasporas according to region or religion of origin, rather than by state of origin.

Diaspora organizations by country of origin

An internet search for diaspora organizations in Norway suggests that there are a number of organizations for Norwegian residents of Indian origin. However, this superficial data gathering indicates nothing about the membership base of these organizations, nor, indeed, regarding their size, and their activities. Some of the leaders of such organizations have been interviewed by the Norwegian mass media, as representatives of the Indian diaspora in Norway. I might be correct to assume that the internal organization of diaspora communities is based on religion or region of origin rather than country of origin. But it may also be that the country of origin becomes a relevant marker of collective identity after arrival in the host country. Since the migrant deals with state legislation and uses mass media, where country of origin is a relevant frame, this might become a relevant framing for him or her, regardless of whether or not it was relevant when the migrant originally chose to emigrate.

Informal diaspora organization

For the mutually reinforcing interaction between socio-cultural integration and socio-economic integration, it is also relevant to have a look at transnational family networks, diaspora political parties, transnational business partnerships and so on. For a detailed discussion, see part 5.9 above. In this regard, *remittances* not only constitute an economic asset, but also a cultural practice. The money transfer company Western Union once ran a telling advertisement campaign called "I send so much more than money", showing photos of happy people enjoying the fruits of the hard labor of their *émigré* relatives.

7.4 Norwegian mass media representations of the Indian community

There are no systematic studies of how the Indian population in Norway is portrayed by the Norwegian mass media. As a pilot study, my co-author has made a brief but systematic literature review, which is found within Appendix 3.

In order to generate hypotheses about what to expect from this literature review, I looked at one systematic study of how selected Norwegian newspapers portray India (Eide 2002, 2005). The author compared a selection of recent news articles on India in the Norwegian press, with the 74 feature articles about India published in one particular magazine through its entire print history (Eide 2002: 102, 199). The news articles were more focused on distress, whereas the feature articles included a wider range of topics, a difference that the researcher explains as the result of different journalistic genres. The selection of feature articles included all non-fiction stories about India published in *A-magasinet*, the weekend supplement to the daily newspaper *Aftenposten*. The newspaper has a reputation for solid journalism and conservative ideology. Its editorial choices have been debated. In the 1970s, some journalists from the new left considered that their contributions were not printed because of internal-censorship (*ibidem*: 111), and during the World War II the newspaper was affiliated with the Nazi occupation regime, its chief editor being the former editor of the weekly supplement (*ibidem*: 109). Nevertheless, neither the newspaper nor its weekly supplement have a reputation for being particularly biased. The researcher concludes that “one cannot characterize the coverage of India(ns) in this popular magazine in a few words. A series of different, at times contradictory discourses and sub-discourses are visible. To a large degree this must be seen as a result of the diversity in the ‘object’ (India) itself.”, and also, “from the 1980s onward, the increased diversity seems to reflect conscious editorial choices” (*ibidem*: 199). Nevertheless, she also found a continuous presence of hierarchical forms of symbolic representation, whereby the citizens of India are being portrayed as less developed, less intelligent and less rational than the Norwegian observer and the Norwegian readership (*ibidem*: 133). The researcher argues that “[i]n the pre-independence period, the findings may [...] be due to a political identification with the colonialist power(s)”, whereas “[i]n the post-independence period as a whole, a clear-cut ‘development optimism’ combined with a Norwegian angle and a corresponding annoyance with and/or pity for the suffering people, is amply present. Representations of Indian daily life is almost totally absent [...] On the other hand, culture and spirituality are well represented in both periods”. With reference to Edward Said’s (1978) critical readings of Western “orientalist” scholarship regarding Southwest Asia, she suggests:

“This tradition may from the beginning (especially in the pre-independence period (1927-1943)) be read as part of a larger Orientalist tradition, in which the Eastern Other is placed below a Western ‘we’: as backward, mystical and at times incomprehensible and irrational. [...] In the post-independence period, *development* replaced colonialism as the dominant relational denominator of the old colonially imposed divide. Consequently in *A-magasinet* discourses of Western benefactors and Indian beneficiaries partly overshadow the old discourses of Oriental splendor and mystique. Norwegian-ness as synonymous with goodness here becomes a central sub-discourse, in which people of India are often essentially represented as *suffering* and *needy* and are seldom allowed to represent themselves to any substantial degree” (*ibidem*: 200).

The media research cited above provides some direction for what might be expected from further media research, or hypothesis generation. Eide (2002, 2005) has observed some benevolent, though discriminatory, representations of India and Indians within a widely read segment of Norwegian mass media. These widely shared representations might be informed by popular prejudice, in turn informing popular prejudice, in a self-amplifying manner. Here we have a possible explanation of the combination of ethnic barriers and gender barriers to the labor market (see 5.2). That may be the situation for some Norwegian residents of Indian origin, according to subjective personal experience (Sharma 2009) as well as analysis of objective registries (Sharma 2009; Birkeland *et al.* 2014). In the chapter about socio-economic conditions (see part 5.7), I argued that this should be interpreted as a combination of sexist and racist discrimination. That argument is built on the view that discriminatory

practices are not necessarily the result of explicit ideology, but can also be the result of an implicit mentality, which is hard to overcome (Chakrabarty 2000; Helland 2014). Thus, racism not only exists as an articulate standpoint, it is also reproduced through cultural practices (or doxa). An optimistic view might be that popular prejudices and mass media bias is the result of lack of information. In another study of the Norwegian mass media, Eriksen and Neuman (2011) observed a discrepancy between the *national* focus of the Norwegian mass media and the *transnational political institutions* in which the Norwegian political elite participate. This discrepancy constitutes a democratic problem, because the voters remain under-informed about the activities of their elected representatives. Similarly, one might also consider that it constitutes a democratic problem if the national focus of Norwegian mass media leaves them badly informed about the *transnational economic flows* in which the national economy is already integrated. At the end of Chapter 5, it was argued that the Indian diaspora is an example of globalization from below, a phenomenon that compliments corporation-led and state-led globalization from above. For the sake of democratic accountability, the Norwegian mass media should overcome their narrow national focus, and strive for socio-cultural integration into a more transnational exchange of information and ideas. One example of such transnational socio-cultural integration is a particular newspaper article used as a source for the present report. It is titled “Highly educated immigrants earn much less than Norwegians” and was, as it happens, recently published in *Aftenposten* (Bjørnstad and Barstad 2014).

Let us now turn to our own pilot study (Appendix 3), after having elaborated hypotheses about what to expect from such a study (the discussion above). My co-author has carried out, for this report, a small pilot study about the symbolic representations of the Indian diaspora in Norwegian mass media, with a sample of c. 120 newspaper stories (see Appendix 3 for further details). The result does not fit with the expected hypothesis. On the contrary, the analysis and interpretation of the chosen sample indicates that Norwegian mass media seem to provide a nuanced and mostly positive view of Norwegian residents of Indian origin. More systematic research on this issue would be scientifically interesting and relevant. If our pilot study is correct, it gives reason for optimism regarding the further socio-cultural integration of the local Indian diaspora into the Norwegian nation, as well as the further socio-cultural integration of the Norwegian nation into a wider fellowship of nations.

Conclusion

This report has provided an overview of social science knowledge about Norwegian residents of Indian origin. Even though Norway is a small country, and accounts for only a small portion of the exchange of goods, money and people between India and Europe, this case is nevertheless of relevance for policy makers in India and Europe because it is particularly well-researched. This small country has a relatively strong social science sector, not only because of the relative prosperity of the country, but also as a result of its welfare state traditions.

This report has presented all quantitative and qualitative research that exists regarding Norwegian residents of Indian origin. It has also discussed under-researched issues under present national policy. After (1) a brief introduction, the report provided (2) a critical literature review, before going in-depth on (3) history, (4) demography, (5) socio-economic integration, (6) legal framework, and finally (6) socio-cultural integration. Because we keep together many different studies, some of our discussions contain novel arguments. The only piece of basic research conducted for the purpose of this research is the small pilot study of media discourse, presented in Appendix 3.

Social research on the Indian diaspora in Norway presents this group as a particularly successful example of migration from non-Western areas into Western Europe. From the viewpoint of welfare-oriented research, this means successful socio-economic integration into the majority middle class population of the host nation.

However, we have sought to complement this perspective with a focus on transnational social capital within diaspora communities, which may facilitate various forms of economic development

(Castles, Haas and Miller 2014: 39-45, 53). Thus, the historical Chapter 3 includes the transnational history of geographically uneven development, whereas Chapter 5 and 7, about socio-economic and socio-cultural integration, include debates about increasing transnational integration between nations (parts 5.6, 5.9, 7.3), in addition to the more traditional debate about the integration of diaspora groups into host nations. Thus, we address issues like remittances and associations, which are of relevance to the maintenance of integration within the transnational diaspora. We also present little known research regarding the complex social mobility of the first generation of migrants from India to Norway (see Appendix 1). A few researchers have used similar perspectives regarding Norwegian residents of Indian origin, in particular Sharma (2009), Wist (2000) and Leirvik (2014a). In the present report, however, we suggest how to further develop such approaches into a new perspective. Thus we take inspiration from a specific tradition of Indian social research, which takes interest in postcolonial complexity, national disunity and the conditions of non-white women (see part 2.5). Consequently, Chapter 3 includes the history of external and internal colonialism in Europe and India (parts 3.2, 3.3), while Chapter 5 discusses how socio-economic discrimination intersect with racism and sexism (parts 5.2, 5.7, 5.8), and Chapter 7 addresses the socio-cultural composition of the host nation, by “unpacking” its actual internal diversity (part 7.2) and discussing the international integration of the Norwegian public sphere (part 7.4). Our small pilot study of representation of the Indian diaspora in the Norwegian press suggests that the presence of the diaspora might help the increasing integration of the national public sphere into a wider fellowship among nations (Appendix 3).

To conclude, this report suggests an approach where socio-economic and socio-cultural integration are discussed not only within a national context (the united of a host nation), but also transnationally (as what unites different nations). Thus, immigration is seen as transnational social capital within diaspora communities, which may be facilitative of various forms of economic development, within a historical context of geographically uneven development. For policy makers in favor of corporate-led economic development, it would be relevant to fund further research into migrants from India to Norway, many of whom are highly-qualified engineers working in the oil and gas industries. For policy makers in favor of social liberal paths to development further inquiries into the first generation of migration from India to Norway might pay off, and in particular the question of how their entrepreneurial efforts have drawn upon and amplified social capital within the diaspora. These research agendas are not mutually exclusive, since the very first immigrants from India to Norway seem to have been educated persons getting specialized work, while some entrepreneurial efforts may potentially scale up to become corporations. For either group of policy makers it would be relevant to gain better knowledge about the socio-economic and socio-cultural significance of remittances.

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Appendix 1. Education levels in the first wave of migration from India to Norway

The first wave of labor migration from India to Norway, started to arrive in the 1970s, and found labor-class jobs in industry and agriculture: but what had been their initial social standing within their area of origin?

It has been argued that, contrary to general opinion in Norway, the immigrants who arrived from the 1960s through the 1980s had special qualifications of utility from the host country (Sharma 2009: 17). The most cited literature takes no interest in the initial social background of the first migrants from India to Norway. In the History of Norwegian Immigration it is observed that Indian first wavers found labor class jobs in Norway, but there is nothing about what kind of conditions they came from in India (Tjelmeland 2003: 129; Kjeldstadli 2003c). The same information – and lack of information – is reproduced in a report by Statistics Norway (Pettersen 2009: 110). These publications deal with diasporas from many different countries of origin, and cannot go into detail with each one of them.

Qualitative researchers clearly argue the view that most of the first wave migrants from India to Norway, came from middle class background in India, though they arrived in a labor class position in Norway. Thus, these Indians tended to bring education from India that they did not get the opportunity to use in Norway. We know this thanks to social anthropologists who conducted fieldwork at both ends of the migration pathway: the Indian Punjab, Pakistani Punjab as well as the Drammen Region in Norway (Kramer 1979a: 150; Kramer 1979c: 55-56; Tambs-Lyche 1979: 47). This has been confirmed by more recent qualitative research, using life course interviews (Sharma 2009: 17, citing Kramer 1980c) or oral history methods (Wist 2000: 16, 26, 27-30, 49-57, citing Kramer 1979a, Tambs-Lyche 1979). For example “we find a former station master and a man with an M.A from Punjab who both work at horticultural production facilities; or a teacher and an office clerk both working as unqualified laborers in a factory” (Kramer 1979c: 150). These examples have not been selected statistically, but nor have they been selected arbitrarily. One should keep in mind that the first wave of migrants from India to Norway was relatively small. Consequently, the method of participant observation may have been sufficient to trace the entire network of persons, whereas a quantitative research design may not have given up significant numbers.

Some quantitative research has been conducted which further confirms, and adds nuances to, the view held by the qualitative researchers: that the first wavers were usually over-qualified for the jobs

they got in Norway. The social historian Wist (2000: 52-53) has analyzed historical data from Statistics Norway. First, she finds that in 1970, 1980 and 1996, most of the Norwegian residents of Indian origin had some education: about 36-43 % had education from higher secondary school, whereas around 22-36 % had education at B.A.-level. These figures are strikingly higher than equivalent residents of Pakistani origin. Nevertheless, these figures were based on a rather small sample (absolute numbers for 1970 and 1980, and a statistical selection for 1993). E.g., in 1970, the statistics included only 111 individuals of Indian origin, so only 40 individuals constituted the 36% with higher secondary school education. Though this figure is not resilient to significant testing, it is useful for descriptive purposes, as a way to map patterns within the conditions that were observed by the ethnographic studies reviewed above. The numbers for 1980 tell us less about education level in the country of origin, since, by then, there would have been time enough for some to pursue an education in the host country. The numbers for 1993 tells us even less, because the units are selected and their number is insignificant. The same historian has also observed, contrary to all other research, that most of the very first migrants from India to Norway in fact found work in middle class professions. In 1970 only 17.8% of the Norwegian residents of Indian origin had labor class jobs, whereas the similar number for residents of Pakistani origin stood at 61.6%. In 1980, the ratio of labor class jobs among residents from India had increased to 53.4%, while the ratio for those from Pakistan had decreased to 22.6% (Wist 2000: 54-55, 49-52). The numbers from 1980 are, then, as meaningful as those from 1970, and together they indicate pluralities among the first wavers: among those of Indian origin, there was downward social mobility during the period (though increasingly an initially relatively high level of education), whereas for those of Pakistani origin social mobility went upwards (while increasing an initially relatively low level of education). These numbers are all the more striking since most first wavers from India and Pakistan came from the same region, Punjab, albeit on different sides of the border. Since there were few migrants, the numbers are too slight to be of any use for (nomothetic) causal analysis, but since they show the absolute numbers, they are nevertheless useful for describing the (ideographic) historical process. Wist (2000: 55) concludes that Norwegian residents of Indian origin “experienced a drastic fall in socio-economic status from 1970 until 1980”.

When taken together, the qualitative and quantitative data suggest a rather complex pattern of social mobility among the first wave of migrants from India to Norway. First, this group as a whole initially brought higher qualifications than the comparable immigrant groups, notably fellow Punjabis from the Pakistani side. Second, the same group experienced considerable downward social mobility during the first decade in Norway, whereas the opposite was the case for immigrants from Pakistan. Nevertheless, within the transnational Indian diaspora, it appears to have been more acceptable to take work below one’s social status in the West, rather than do “suitable” work back home in India (Kramer 1979a: 150). Also in socio-economic terms, the middle class in the Indian Punjab and the labor class in Drammen cannot be automatically compared on the same scale, because the two regions were positioned differently within the global pattern of geographically uneven development (see Chapter 3): Remittances from abroad have a value in pure cash terms, transcending any differences in social status.

Appendix 2. Parental benefits, maternity leave and paternity leave

Norway has generous maternity leave, paternity leave, and parental benefits that compensate for income when one of the parents is away from work. In order to qualify for parental benefits, the annual taxable income of the mother must exceed at least half of the National Insurance’s basic-level, 90,068 NOK. Note that it is only the previous income of the mother, not the father, which forms the basis for eligibility and for the size of parental leave benefits. This is to provide an incentive for women to work, if they plan to become mothers. Norway has a family friendly work environment, in the sense that it is generally accepted by Norwegian employers that employees – both fathers and mothers – take time away from work to fulfil parental leave obligations (NAV 2015).

The parental benefit period is split into three parts: One quota for the mother, one quota for the father, and a shared period. The total benefit period in case of birth, for employees, is either 49 weeks of 100% coverage, or 59 weeks of 80% coverage. However, there is a limit: NAV only compensates for incomes up to six times the National Insurance basic amount. Three weeks (fifteen working days) of the parental benefit period, are reserved for the mother and must be used prior to the due date. These weeks cannot be used after the child is born. The mother has three weeks leave that must be used before birth. After birth, the mother and father have a quota of ten weeks each. Then there is a shared period that the parents must divide between the two of them of twenty-six or thirty-six weeks, depending on whether a 100% or 80% period is chosen. The parents can also postpone parts of their leave, but any remaining days are lost when a child turns three. In the case of multiple births, the benefit period is extended by five weeks for each additional child. Parental benefits are also given when children are adopted. Then the child must be fifteen or younger for the parents to be eligible (*ibidem*).

Appendix 3. Brief review of how Indians in Norway are covered by the Norwegian media

A sample of media stories were collected from Norwegian language media sources, from the previous three years (28 August 2015). All of the stories relate to Indians living in Norway. This includes both Indians who have immigrated to Norway and who are still Indian citizens, as well as people of Indian descent who have immigrated to Norway and have Norwegian citizenship, and also the children of these two groups, as well as Indian tourists. Together, this totalled approximately 120 stories. The sample was taken from a very wide database (Atekst retriever Norway 2015). This includes print newspapers and journals, their online editions, pure online news-sources, and niche-publications, such as research news, or a professional journal of engineers.

The selection was carried out in two steps:

First, using a series of keyword and string searches that might indicate relevance.

Second, all the hits were manually surveyed and the suitable stories were selected for the sample.

Sometimes, one story would be duplicated and appear with mostly similar content in many publications – perhaps due to cooperation between different media outlets – then, only one example would be chosen as part of the sample. This form of selection is not exact, since it is likely that there are stories which would have been relevant, but which have not been selected. However, it is likely that a substantial part of all relevant stories have been selected as part of the sample. It does give a bird eyes view of the media landscape at this point in time, which can be presented. Below, some categories that cover much of the stories in the sample are considered.

Positive, neutral or negative

It is striking that the majority of the stories, give a positive image of Indians in Norway, or Indian culture in general. There is, sometimes, an emphasis on exotic and different Indian culture or habits, but this is done in a way that may increase the curiosity of the reader. It was striking to see the importance of local newspapers in relation to this. They would often provide stories from more everyday settings, where the reader could get to know interviewees in a more positive way. Some, but relatively fewer, stories are more neutral. These are stories that are more statistical or research related – where statistics on immigration are reported, or immigration and ethnic minorities are commented on as an issue in itself. The main topic in these articles are not Indians, they are being mentioned as one out of several other minority groups. There are a few stories that have negative connotations. All of the latter cover a specific court case from 2015, when an Indian immigrant, running a small business outside a town in eastern Norway, organised for workers from India to work for him. He was accused of providing his workers with very bad working conditions, withholding salary, insufficient accounting and possible tax evasion, as well as violent threats against workers considering talking with the Norwegian authorities. While this story is exceptional, it indicates that Indian migrant

workers in Norway may face problems of harsh working conditions: something which has also been true of earlier generations of immigrants.

Cultural events

A number of lengthy articles reports cultural events, which Indians organize or participate in. The event that has generated most reporting was a “turban day”, organized by the Sikh community. This occurs once yearly, and here locals are given the chance to wear a turban. Many journalists used this as a point of departure to write about Sikh religion and its practitioners in Norway. It was striking to see how one small event such as that, could generate so much positive media coverage. Also, some of the articles invited reflections on cultural complexity, in the sense of how Indians adapted or mixed Indian traditions with Norwegian life. Other examples of cultural events that were covered in the media were: cricket tournaments, local cricket teams, production of a Bollywood film, celebration of India’s independence day, participation of Indians in Norway’s national day, and various religious events.

Food

A number of articles also related to Indian food. These could be articles about restaurants – such as the opening of a new restaurant, or interviewing a restaurant owner or cook. Some articles presented Indian recipes, and some were restaurant reviews.

Portraits of individuals

The sample also contained several journalistic portraits of people from an Indian background. The journalist would then write about the subject’s background. He or she would talk about the society that they grew up in, or about their Indian cultural background. Examples of portraits include successful athletes, other general celebrities, or persons in a local community that have done something notable. I was surprised at how many local newspapers worked as an arena to present longer life stories and contextualized portraits which gave others the chance to get to know details about another person in their community.